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Protecting the First Amendment Rights of 
Video Games from Lanham Act and 





In 2013 and 2015, the Ninth Circuit decided two nearly identical cases in 
which professional football players alleged a video game publisher used their 
likenesses without authorization in a game that simulates real football games.  
One plaintiff brought a false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, while 
others brought state law right of publicity claims.  That made all the 
difference.  The Ninth Circuit found the First Amendment protected the game 
against the false endorsement claim, but not against the right of publicity 
claims.  These contradictory results stem from court’s application of 
the Rogers v. Grimaldi test to Lanham Act claims and the transformative use 
test to right of publicity claims.  A review of both lines of precedent in the 
video game context and a comparison of the cases with each other and to 
cases involving traditional forms of expressive works reveal two problems 
that must be addressed.  First, many courts fail to view video games as 
expressive works equal to books, television shows, and films, and instead view 
them as products and merchandise like lithographs and t-shirts.  Second, the 
transformative use test suffers from subjectivity and fails to properly 
recognize First Amendment protection over video games aiming for realism.  
This article proposes resolving both problems by applying the Rogers test to 
both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims. 
  
 
 * Appellate attorney at Horvitz & Levy LLP in Burbank, California.  The opinions expressed in 
this article are mine.  My firm handles California and Ninth Circuit appeals and might have represented 
parties or amici curiae in some cases discussed in this article, but I have not been involved in any such 
cases.  Thanks to the editors of the Pepperdine Law Review and to all friends of Purple Poring. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Lawsuits against video game publishers over the use of marks and 
likenesses have proliferated with the recent meteoric growth of the video 
game and esports industries.1  In just the past decade, Activision Blizzard 
faced at least three lawsuits over its use of marks or likenesses in the Call of 
Duty franchise.2  Meanwhile, Electronic Arts has faced numerous lawsuits 
over its use of the likenesses of college and professional athletes’ likenesses 
in Madden NFL and NCAA Football.3  More recently, Epic Games and Take-
Two have faced a flurry of cases over their use of dance moves in Fortnite 
and NBA 2K.4  An analysis of Lanham Act and right of publicity cases in the 
video game context reveals two problems.  First, courts remain reluctant to 
view video games as expressive works equal to traditional entertainment 
media; instead, they view them as products and merchandise like lithographs 
and t-shirts.  Second, even when the facts are nearly identical, the results in 
these cases can differ depending entirely on the legal theory alleged by a 
plaintiff. 
These problems stem in part from the different tests applied to Lanham 
Act claims and right of publicity claims.  In cases arising from the Lanham 
Act, courts apply the Second Circuit’s Rogers v. Grimaldi test to balance the 
plaintiff’s rights with the defendant’s First Amendment rights.5  The Rogers 
test has upheld video game publishers’ First Amendment rights, leading to 
Activision’s victories in the Call of Duty cases and EA’s win in one case 
involving Madden NFL.6  By contrast, in right of publicity cases, courts apply 
the transformative use test.7  And unlike the Rogers test, the transformative 
 
 1. See generally Yen-Shyang Tseng, The Principles of Esports Engagement: A Universal Code 
of Conduct?, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 209, 211–15 (2020) (discussing growth of video games and 
esports). 
 2. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 3. See, e.g., infra Sections III.D.3, IV.D.1–3.  
 4. See infra Section IV.V.3 (discussing lawsuits filed against Epic Games and Take-Two). 
 5. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
 6. See Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding in favor of 
Electronic Arts when applying the Rogers test); AM General, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. 
Supp. 3d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (granting a motion for summary judgment and dismissing trademark 
infringement claims after applying Lanham Act analysis); Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision 
Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding in favor of Activision based on 
use of the Rogers test); Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, 41 F. Supp. 3d 885 , 898–901 (C.D. 
Cal 2013) (holding in favor of Activision based on use of the Rogers test). 
 7. See infra Section IV.B. 
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use test has failed to adequately respect the First Amendment, leading to 
several of EA’s losses in cases involving Madden NFL and NCAA Football.8  
Further, the subjectivity of the transformative use test has allowed courts to 
make the inexplicable distinction between video games and other forms of 
expressive works. 
Commentators have acknowledged the problem arising from the courts 
reaching inconsistent results.9  Several have advocated for greater protection 
for trademark owners and individuals by importing the transformative use test 
applied in right of publicity cases to Lanham Act cases.10  This article proposes 
applying the Rogers test to both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims to 
adequately protect the First Amendment rights of video games.  Doing so 
would satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis that should be applied to the right of 
publicity as a content-based restriction on speech.  And it would recognize 
that video games are expressive works like books, television shows, and 
films—not products or merchandise like lithographs and t-shirts.  Yet at the 
same time, it would properly protect both mark owners and individuals whose 
marks or likenesses have been misappropriated for commercial use. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION OF ENTERTAINMENT 
The First Amendment has long protected entertainment as a form of 
expression.  In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
protected magazines, finding “[t]he line between the informing and the 
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [a free press].  Everyone is 
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.  What is one man’s 
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”11  Four years later, the Court 
extended First Amendment protection to motion picture films, finding “[t]he 
importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened 
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.”12  And in 
the first and only right of publicity case the Court heard, it reiterated that 
 
 8. See, e.g., infra Sections IV.C.2., IV.D.1–3. 
 9. See, e.g., Arlen Papazian, Let’s Stop Play Games: A Consistent Test for Unlicensed Trademark 
Use and the Right of Publicity in Video Games, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 577, 592–96 (2017). 
 10. See id. at 596–603. 
 11. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); see also Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding the First 
Amendment protects forms of expression even if they are only for entertainment), aff’d, 207 N.E.2d 
508 (N.Y. 1965). 
 12. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
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“[t]here is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First 
Amendment protection.”13 
The Court also made it clear that the First Amendment protects 
entertainment even though entertainment is often created for profit: “That 
books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not 
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded 
by the First Amendment.  We fail to see why operation for profit should have 
any different effect in the case of motion pictures.”14  Likewise, the California 
Supreme Court held, “[w]hen expression protected by the First Amendment 
is involved, ‘[i]t is of course no matter that the dissemination takes place under 
commercial auspices.’”15  In the court’s seminal right of publicity decision in 
1979, it reiterated that “[t]he First Amendment is not limited to those who 
publish without charge.  Whether the activity involves newspaper publication 
or motion picture production, it does not lose its constitutional protection 
because it is undertaken for profit.”16 
Many decades later, in the era of lawsuits challenging regulations over 
“violent” games, lower courts began to recognize the First Amendment’s 
protection of video games.17  The Eighth Circuit saw “no reason why the 
pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds, music, stories, and narrative 
present in video games are not entitled to a similar protection” as paintings, 
 
 13. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
 14. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 501–02; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) 
(affirming the principle that an article being produced for trade purposes does not prevent it from being 
considered a protected form of expression). 
 15. Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 297 (Cal. 1966) (quoting Smith v. People of California, 361 
U.S. 147, 150 (1959)). 
 16. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., concurring).  
Chief Justice Bird’s concurrence was endorsed by three other justices and therefore “commanded the 
support of the majority of the court.”  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
802–03, n.7 (Cal. 2001). 
 17. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding a California legislative act seeking to limit sales of violent video games to minors was an 
invalid infringement on First Amendment rights), aff’d sub nom, Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 
564 U.S. 786 (2011); Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 
2003) (upholding the First Amendment rights of violent video games against a law restricting sale of 
these games to minors); James v. Meow Media Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (extending 
First Amendment protections to video game when plaintiff sought tort liability against game producers 
for communicative aspects of the game); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 
579–80 (7th Cir. 2001) (recognizing First Amendment protections of video games against city 
ordinance limiting access of minors to violent games). 
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music, and literature.18  The Ninth Circuit found that “story-laden video games 
. . . are similar to movies, which the [Supreme] Court has long held are 
protected expression notwithstanding their ability to entertain as well as 
inform.”19  In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the First Amendment’s 
protection of video games, holding: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, 
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, 
plot and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such 
as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).  That suffices to 
confer First Amendment protection.20 
Nevertheless, recent decisions and commentary by lower courts 
sometimes suggest a view of video games as less deserving of First 
Amendment protection than other expressive works.21  These courts often 
view video games more as products or merchandise rather than as expressive 
works.22  For example, the 2018 California Court of Appeal decision in de 
Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC distinguished “expressive works such as 
films, plays, and television programs” from “products and merchandise such 
as T-shirts and lithographs, greeting cards, and video games, or 
 
 18. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 957 (comparing these elements of video games to 
the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll”). 
 19. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 958 n.11. 
 20. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790. 
 21. See generally William K. Ford, So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?  Games and the Right of 
Publicity Revisited, 19 UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 178 (2020) [hereinafter So Are Games Coffee Mugs 
or What?] (discussing how video games are still treated like celebrity memorabilia but predicting a 
shift in the way courts will treat them in the near future); William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video 
Games, False Association Claims, and the “Explicitly Misleading” Use of Trademarks, 16 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306, 310–311 (2017) [hereinafter Restoring Rogers] (discussing 
the evolution of different approaches to First Amendment rights and video games in the Ninth Circuit 
and the specific issue of judges seeing video games not as distinguishable from t-shirts and mugs); 
William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 
29 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 1 (2012) (arguing that the evolution of games calls for a new 
approach in rights of publicity claims that treats games as more than memorabilia). 
 22. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 179 (noting that lower court 
decisions after Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n have “failed to drag games out of the merchandise 
category for purposes of the right of publicity”); Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 89 (“Games are 
treated differently than newspapers, magazines, books, and films because these courts perceive games 
as an inferior medium of expression, i.e., as merchandise like coffee mugs and T-shirts.”). 
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advertisements for products and merchandise.”23  Similarly, during a 2014 
oral argument in Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc,24 when EA’s counsel sought to 
distinguish video games and other expressive works from greeting cards and 
t-shirts, a judge commented that “99% of greeting cards, it seems to me, have 
pictures and they have writing and they’re at least as expressive as a video 
game, probably more so.”25  The court’s opinion ultimately distinguished the 
case before it involving a video game from “cases involving other kinds of 
expressive works.”26  Similar examples appear later in this article.27 
III. CASES BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION OF VIDEO 
GAMES WITH TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
A. Federal Trademark Rights: The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., establishes federal trademark 
law.28  Broadly speaking, “[a] trademark is a word, phrase or symbol that is 
used to identify a manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a 
service.”29  Among other things, the Lanham Act prohibits trademark 
infringement, false designations of origin, and false endorsement.30  Section 
1114(1)(a) prohibits the use of a registered trademark “in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on 
 
 23. 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 636, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted), review denied (July 11, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800, 202 L. Ed. 2d 572 (2019). 
 24. 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 25. Oral Argument at 9:33, Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-
15737), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hlz3cx6IWQ; see also Restoring Rogers, supra note 21, 
at 311 (emphasis omitted) (explaining why the comparison of video games to greeting cards is 
striking). 
 26. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1279, n.10 
(9th Cir. 2013).  
 27. See infra Section V.B. 
 28. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4 
(5th ed. 2020) [hereinafter TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION]; see also 3 TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION at § 22:1–22:1.50 (“Federal trademark law does not preempt state trademark 
law,” and most states have adopted trademark law similar to federal trademark law.).  This article 
focuses on federal law.  See infra Sections III.C–D, IV.D, V.C. 
 29. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002);  see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2012) (defining trademark, service mark, and other related terms); TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 3:1 (defining a trademark as “a designation used to identify and 
distinguish the source of goods and services of a person or company”). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2016). 
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or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive.”31  Section 1125(a)(1) prohibits the use of:  
Any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which––(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person 
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, 
or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.32 
Trademark rights serve dual purposes: they “protect consumers from 
deception and confusion over trademarks” and they “protect the plaintiff’s 
infringed trademark as property.”33  In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
Justice Stevens reviewed the Senate Report for the Lanham Act and found 
two stated goals: 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold.  One is to 
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product 
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get 
the product which it asks for and wants to get.  Secondly, where the 
owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in 
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment 
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.  This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark 
owner.34 
 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(B) (2016). 
 33. See TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 2:2.  As McCarthy explains, 
however, commentators have disagreed over whether the historical purpose of trademark law is to 
protect the consumer from confusion or to protect the mark owner’s property right.  See TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 2:1. 
 34. 505 U.S. 763, 782, n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946)); see 
also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (describing the “basic objectives of 
trademark law”).  Many articles have discussed the purposes of trademark law.  See, e.g., Ned Snow, 
Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1639, 1666–77 (2016); Noa Tai, Aesthetic 
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The Ninth Circuit has described the “core purpose” of trademark law as 
“avoiding confusion in the marketplace” by “preventing others from duping 
consumers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the 
trademark owner.”35  Avoiding consumer confusion serves the two goals of 
“assur[ing] a potential customer” that the item with the mark “is made by the 
same producer as other similarly marked items” and assuring the producer that 
“it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product.”36 
B. The Second Circuit’s Rogers v. Grimaldi test 
In 1989, the Second Circuit issued its seminal decision in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, which established the test courts would apply to balance the 
Lanham Act with the First Amendment for decades to come.37  Actress Ginger 
Rogers sued an Italian filmmaker over the film Ginger and Fred, which told 
“the story of two fictional cabaret performers” who imitated Rogers and Fred 
Astaire and “became known in Italy as Ginger and Fred.”38  Rogers alleged 
the filmmaker violated the Lanham Act, her right of publicity, and her right 
to privacy.39  She argued the filmmaker violated the Lanham Act by “creating 
the false impression that the film was about her or that she sponsored, 
endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the film.”40 
The Second Circuit recognized the conflict between the Lanham Act’s 
protection of consumers and the First Amendment’s protection of artistic 
expressions: “Movies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works of 
artistic expression and deserve protection,” but those works are “also sold in 
the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, making the 
danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that warrants some 
 
Functionality: Trademark Law’s Red Herring Doctrine, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 25, 28–30 (2013). 
 35. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Au-Tomotive 
Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The principal role of 
trademark law is to ensure that consumers are able to identify the source of goods.”). 
 36. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164; Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1067 (noting that “[p]rotecting the 
source-identifying role of trademarks serves [these] two goals”). 
 37. See 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 38. Id. at 996–97.  As the Second Circuit explained, “Rogers and the late Fred Astaire are among 
the most famous duos in show business history” who “established themselves as paragons of style, 
elegance, and grace.”  Id. at 996. 
 39. Id. at 997. 
 40. Id. 
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government regulation.”41  The court concluded that, “[b]ecause 
overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on 
First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a 
conflict.”42 
The court then analyzed what test should apply.43  It rejected the 
“alternative means” test, where “First Amendment concerns are implicated 
only where a title is so intimately related to the subject matter of a work that 
the author has no alternative means of expressing what the work is about.”44  
Instead, the court found “the [Lanham Act] should be construed to apply to 
artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”45  “That balance,” the court 
said, “will normally not support application of the [Lanham] Act unless the 
title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has 
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or 
the content of the work.”46 
The Second Circuit explained the rationale behind this two-part test, that 
“[a] misleading title with no artistic relevance cannot be sufficiently justified 
by a free expression interest.”47  Moreover, a title with “minimal artistic 
relevance but [that] was explicitly misleading as to source or content” could 
still violate the Lanham Act.48  But when “the title is artistically relevant to 
the work . . . the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly 
suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the 
danger of restricting artistic expression, and the Lanham Act is not 
applicable.”49 
Applying this test, the court found “[t]he title ‘Ginger and Fred’ 
surpasse[d] the minimum threshold of artistic relevance to the film’s content” 
because “the central characters in the film are nicknamed ‘Ginger and Fred,’ 
and these names are not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 998.  
 43. Id. at 998–1000. 
 44. Id. at 998.  The Second Circuit had previously applied the “no alternative means” test in Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 45. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 1000. 
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of their real life counterparts but instead have genuine relevance to the film’s 
story.”50  It then found the title was not misleading because it “contains no 
explicit indication that Rogers endorsed the film or had a role in producing 
it,” it “is entirely truthful as to its content in referring to the film’s fictional 
protagonists who are known to their Italian audience as ‘Ginger and Fred,’” 
and it “has an ironic meaning that is relevant to the film’s content.”51  In short, 
any risk that some members of the public might be misled “is outweighed by 
the danger that suppressing an artistically relevant though ambiguous title will 
unduly restrict expression.”52  Thus, the First Amendment protected the film’s 
title.53 
C. Development of the Rogers Test in the Ninth Circuit and Its Application 
to Video Games 
Many courts would later adopt the Rogers test and extend it to the content 
of expressive works.54  The Ninth Circuit, however, has led the charge and 
developed the most robust jurisdiction on the application of the Rogers test to 
video games.55  This is perhaps unsurprising given the number of major video 
game publishers in California, including Riot Games,56 Activision Blizzard,57 
and Electronic Arts.58 
1. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records and Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Productions 
The Ninth Circuit first adopted the Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA 
Records, Inc., in which Mattel, the maker of the Barbie dolls, sued MCA 
 
 50. Id. at 1001. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1005. 
 54. See Daniel Jacob Wright, Explicitly Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit, 21 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 193, 203–06 (2013).  
 55. Id. at 209, 212–13. 
 56. We Are Rioters, RIOT GAMES, https://www.riotgames.com/en/who-we-are/values (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2020) (“Riot is headquartered in Los Angeles, California.”). 
 57. About Us, ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, https://www.activisionblizzard.com/location (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2020) (identifying corporate headquarters in Santa Monica, California). 
 58. About EA, EA, https://www.ea.com/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) (identifying global 
headquarters in Redwood City, California). 
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Records (and others) for trademark infringement over the song Barbie Girl by 
Aqua.59  As Judge Kozinski described, Barbie dolls represent “a symbol of 
American girlhood, a public figure who graces the aisles of toy stores 
throughout the country and beyond,”60 while “Aqua [was] a Danish band that 
has, as yet, only dreamed of attaining Barbie-like status.”61  “In the song, one 
bandmember impersonates Barbie, singing in a high-pitched, doll-like voice; 
another bandmember, calling himself Ken, entices Barbie ‘to go party.’”62 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s analysis in Rogers and 
adopted the Rogers test as its own.63  Applying the test, the court first found 
“the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work,” 
since “the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua claims she represents.”64  
The court then found “[t]he song title [did] not explicitly mislead as to the 
source of the work [because] it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that 
it was produced by Mattel.”65  The court noted that “[the] only indication that 
Mattel might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title,” and 
that alone could not be enough or the Rogers test would be rendered a nullity.66 
A year after MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its adoption of the 
Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions.67  Mattel had 
sued photographer Thomas Forsythe over “a series of [seventy-eight] 
photographs entitled ‘Food Chain Barbie,’ . . . [which] depicted Barbie in 
various absurd and often sexualized positions.”68  “Forsythe describe[d] the 
message behind his photographic series as an attempt to ‘critique[] the 
objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and [] [to] lambast[] the 
conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects 
because this is what Barbie embodies.’”69 
The Ninth Circuit found Forsythe’s work was a parody entitled to First 
 
 59. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 898. 
 61. Id. at 899. 
 62. Id. at 899. 
 63. Id. at 902. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 68. Id. at 796. 
 69. Id. (alterations in original). 
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Amendment protection,70 and then went on to apply the Rogers test.71  As for 
artistic relevance, the court found “Forsythe’s use of the Barbie mark is clearly 
relevant to his work.”72  As for whether the use was explicitly misleading, the 
court found “[t]he Barbie mark in the titles of Forsythe’s works and on his 
website accurately describe[s] the subject of the photographs, which in turn, 
depict Barbie and target the doll with Forsythe’s parodic message.”73 
2. E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc. 
Like Rogers, MCA Records and Walking Mountain involved titles of 
expressive works—the Barbie Girl song and the Food Chain Barbie 
photograph series.74  And Walking Mountain expressly left open the question 
whether the Ninth Circuit would apply the Rogers test to the body of an 
expressive work.75 
Five years after Walking Mountain, the Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers 
test both to the body of an expressive work and to the use of a trademark in a 
video game in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.76  
There, the operator of the strip club Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club in East Los 
Angeles sued Rockstar Games, a subsidiary of Take-Two Interactive, over the 
depiction of a strip club in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.77 
The Grand Theft Auto “[s]eries is known for an irreverent and sometimes 
crass brand of humor, gratuitous violence and sex, and overall seediness.”78  
“Each game . . . takes place in one or more dystopic, cartoonish cities modeled 
after actual American urban areas.”79  San Andreas takes place in cities “based 
on Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Las Vegas.”80  Los Santos—the city based 
 
 70. Id. at 801–03. 
 71. Id. at 807.  In doing so, the court placed heavy emphasis on Barbie’s “cultural significance,” 
just as it had done in MCA.   Id. (“Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment 
protections come into play. . . .  As we determined in MCA, Mattel’s ‘Barbie’ mark has taken on such 
a role in our culture.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See supra Part C.1. 
 75. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 808–09, nn.14 & 17. 
 76. 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 77. Id. at 1096–98. 
 78. Id. at 1096. 
 79. Id. at 1097. 
 80. Id. 
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on Los Angeles—“mimics the look and feel of actual Los Angeles 
neighborhoods” by populating the city “with [] liquor stores, ammunition 
dealers, casinos, pawn shops, tattoo parlors, bars, and strip clubs.”81  In East 
Los Santos, “the [g]ame’s version of East Los Angeles,” Rockstar included 
“variations on the businesses and architecture of the real thing, including a 
virtual, cartoon-style strip club known as the ‘Pig Pen.’”82  ESS argued that 
Rockstar’s depiction of the Pig Pen used the Play Pen’s “distinctive logo and 
trade dress” and “created a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to 
whether ESS has endorsed, or is associated with, the video depiction” of the 
club.83 
The Ninth Circuit first found that, while the Rogers test “traditionally 
applies to uses of a trademark in the title of an artistic work, there is no 
principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use of a trademark in the 
body of the work.”84  The court then applied the test.85  It clarified that “the 
level of [artistic] relevance merely must be above zero” to merit First 
Amendment protection.86  The court found it irrelevant whether the Play Pen 
itself had any cultural significance.87  The distinctiveness of East Los Angeles 
“[lay] in its ‘look and feel,’” which was “relevant to Rockstar’s artistic goal 
. . . to develop a cartoon-style parody of East Los Angeles.”88  The court 
concluded that “[p]ossibly the only way, and certainly a reasonable way, to 
do that is to recreate a critical mass of the businesses and buildings that 
constitute it”––“includ[ing] a strip club similar in look and feel to the Play 
Pen.”89 
Turning to the explicitly misleading prong, the court noted the analysis 
“points directly at the purpose of trademark law, namely to ‘avoid confusion 
in the marketplace by allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from 
duping customers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored 
by the trademark owner.’”90  The court reiterated that mere use of the 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1098. 
 84. See id. at 1099. 
 85. Id. at 1099–1100. 
 86. Id. at 1100.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
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trademark was not enough; instead, the relevant question was “whether the 
Game would confuse its players into thinking that the Play Pen [was] 
somehow behind the Pig Pen or that it sponsor[ed]” the game.91  It found San 
Andreas and the Play Pen had “nothing in common” other than “offer[ing] a 
form of lowbrow entertainment.”92  Nothing suggested anyone would 
reasonably believe that ESS produced the game or that Rockstar operated a 
strip club.93  Moreover, a player would not “think ESS had provided [any] 
expertise, support, or unique strip-club knowledge it possesses to the 
production of the game.”94  “[T]he Game [did] not revolve around running or 
patronizing a strip club,” and “[w]hatever one can do at the Pig Pen seems 
quite incidental to the overall story of the Game.”95  Finally, “[a] reasonable 
consumer would not think a company that owns one strip club in East Los 
Angeles, which is not well known to the public at large, also produces a 
technology sophisticated video game like San Andreas.”96 
3. Confusion Within the District Courts 
After ESS, some confusion developed in the district courts over three 
issues: (1) whether the Rogers test applies only to trademarks that have 
achieved cultural significance, (2) whether a defendant must use the mark to 
refer to the plaintiff for it to have artistic relevance, and (3) the role of the 
likelihood of confusion test in the Rogers analysis.97  Two decisions from the 
Northern District of California illustrate the difficulties lower courts had in 
applying the Rogers test. 
In Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, a reggae band using the name “Rebelution” 
in its business and in a self-titled album sued Armando Perez (known as 
Pitbull) because he used the word rebelution in the title of a record.98  The 
district court denied Pitbull’s summary judgment motion based on the Rogers 
test on two relevant grounds.99 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1100–01 (italics added). 
 97. See Wright, supra note 54, at 209–13. 
 98. 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 885–886 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 889.  Relying on footnote 5 in Rogers, the court also held the Rogers test did not apply 
because the case before it involved two confusingly similar titles.  Id. at 888.  While a full discussion 
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First, citing MCA Records and Walking Mountain, the district court found 
the Ninth Circuit had “placed an important threshold limitation upon its 
application: plaintiff’s mark must be of such cultural significance that it has 
become an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.”100  The Ninth Circuit’s 
decisions in MCA Records and Walking Mountain heavily emphasized 
Barbie’s cultural significance, and Judge Kozinski suggested the conflict 
between the Lanham Act and the First Amendment “arises when trademarks 
transcend their identifying purpose” and “enter our public discourse and 
become an integral part of our vocabulary.”101  In Rebelution, because neither 
the word “rebelution” nor plaintiff’s mark had cultural significance, the court 
found “no First Amendment rights are implicated and the Rogers test is 
inapplicable.”102 
Second, the court surveyed “every federal court of appeals case 
addressing the artistic adoption of plaintiff’s non-generic mark” and found 
that a defendant’s use of a mark must “be with reference to the meaning 
associated with plaintiff’s mark” to have artistic relevance under the first part 
of the Rogers test.103  In other words, the court found Pitbull had to show “he 
intended to refer to plaintiff when he used plaintiff’s mark,” and he did not do 
so.104 
 
of the distinction between titles and contents of expressive works is beyond the scope of this article, 
this holding does not withstand scrutiny.  See Lynn M. Jordan & David M. Kelly, Another Decade of 
Rogers v. Grimaldi: Continuing to Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of 
Creators of Artistic Works, 109 TRADEMARK REP. 833, 846–47 (2019).  The Second Circuit clarified 
that the Rogers test applies to cases involving titles alleged to be confusingly similar but that the 
explicitly misleading prong would include a likelihood of confusion analysis.  See Cliffs Notes, Inc. 
v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989); Twin Peaks Prods., 
Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993).  One district court within the Ninth 
Circuit also found the Rogers test applies to cases involving similar titles and that any similarities 
simply bear on the explicitly misleading prong of the test.  See CI Games S.A. v. Destination Films, 
No. 2:16-cv-05719-SVW-JC, 2016 WL 9185391, at *3–5, *8–9 (C. D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 100. See Rebelution, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
 101. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2000).  Judge Kozinski further 
said that 
when a trademark owner asserts a right to control how we express ourselves—when we’d 
find it difficult to describe the product any other way (as in the case of aspirin), or when 
the mark (like Rolls Royce) has taken on an expressive meaning apart from its source-
identifying function—applying the traditional [likelihood of confusion] test fails to account 
for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.” 
Id. 
 102. Rebelution, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 888. 
 103. Id. at 888–89. 
 104. Id. at 889. 
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In Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., Electronic Arts (“EA”) sued 
Textron, the holding company of Bell’s intellectual property rights, for 
declaratory judgment and non-infringement over the depiction of certain Bell 
helicopters in EA’s Battlefield 3.105  Textron filed counterclaims alleging 
trademark infringement and other claims.106 
The district court addressed EA’s motion to dismiss Textron’s 
counterclaims.107  Without addressing the applicability of the Rogers test or 
the artistic relevance prong, the court focused its analysis on whether EA’s 
use of the helicopters was explicitly misleading as to the source and content 
of Battlefield 3.108  In doing so, the court appeared to apply a likelihood of 
confusion analysis.109  At the same time, however, the court found that 
Textron’s counter-complaint alleged “that the helicopters were a main selling 
point for the game” and “EA intended consumer confusion.”110 
Rebelution and Textron raised several questions.  First, does the Rogers 
test apply only to trademarks that have achieved cultural significance?  
Second, must the defendant’s use of the mark refer to the plaintiff?  Third, 
does the likelihood of confusion analysis have any place in the Rogers test?  
The Ninth Circuit would later answer all three questions with a resounding 
“no.” 
4. Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers test to a video game in 
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., where legendary former NFL player and NFL 
Hall of Fame member Jim Brown sued EA over the use of his likeness in the 
Madden NFL series based on a false endorsement theory.111  This case 
presented the Ninth Circuit with the first opportunity to clarify the Rogers test 
after Rebelution and Textron, and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. 
 
 105. No. C 12-00118 WHA, 2012 WL 3042668, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).  
 106. Id. at *1.  
 107. Id. at *2. 
 108. Id. at *3. 
 109. See id. at *4 (appearing to reject EA’s contention “that the ‘likelihood of confusion’ analysis 
should not come into play unless the work fails the Rogers test”). 
 110. Id. at *5.  These findings suggest the court’s somewhat muddied analysis and reference to the 
likelihood of confusion test might nevertheless have focused on the right question: whether EA’s use 
of Textron’s trademarks was explicitly misleading as to the source or content of the work.  See id.  
 111. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239–41 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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In Madden NFL, players “control avatars representing professional 
football players as those avatars participate in simulated NFL games” and 
“participate in other aspects of a simulated NFL by, for example, creating and 
managing a franchise.”112  Each version of Madden NFL includes the NFL 
teams and their rosters for that year, and each avatar is designed to mirror a 
real player, “including the player’s name, jersey number, physical attributes, 
and physical skills.”113  Some versions of Madden NFL “also include historical 
and all-time teams,” where player names are not used but are nevertheless 
“recognizable due to the accuracy of their team affiliations, playing positions, 
ages, heights, weights, ability levels, and other attributes.”114  While EA 
licenses from the NFL and NFL Players Association for its use of the names 
and likenesses of current players, those licenses do not cover former players 
such as Brown, who played for the Cleveland Browns from 1957 to 1965.115 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by holding that the Rogers test alone 
applies to cases balancing the Lanham Act against First Amendment rights in 
expressive works.116  The court rejected the likelihood of confusion test and 
the alternative means test, finding that both tests “fail[ed] to account for the 
full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.”117  As the court 
explained, “[t]he only relevant legal framework for balancing the public’s 
right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown’s affiliation with 
Madden NFL and EA’s First Amendment rights in the context of Brown’s 
[Lanham Act] claim is the Rogers test.”118 
In reaching this result, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s recent 
holding in Brown and quipped, “[e]ven if Madden NFL is not the expressive 
equal of Anna Karenina or Citizen Kane, the Supreme Court has answered 
with an emphatic ‘yes’ when faced with the question of whether video games 
deserve the same protection as more traditional forms of expression.”119  The 
court suggested there might be a “line to be drawn between expressive video 
games and non-expressive video games,” but every version of Madden NFL 
is expressive because they “feature[] characters (players), dialogue (between 
 
 112. Id. at 1240. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1239–40. 
 116. See id. at 1241. 
 117. Id. at 1241–42 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 118. Id. at 1242. 
 119. Id. at 1241. 
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announcers), plot (both within a particular simulated game and more broadly), 
and music,” as well as “[i]nteraction between the virtual world of the game 
and individuals playing the game.”120 
Applying the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit found the use of Brown’s 
likeness had artistic relevance.121  The court focused on the game’s realism: 
“EA prides itself on the extreme realism of the games,” and the “importance 
of including Brown’s likeness to realistically recreate one of the teams in the 
game” made it obvious that his “likeness has at least some artistic relevance 
to EA’s work.”122  Moreover, the court found the “content of the Madden NFL 
games––the simulation of NFL football––is clearly related” to Brown, a 
former NFL player.123 
Next, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the key to satisfying the explicitly 
misleading analysis is “that the creator must explicitly mislead consumers.”124  
Thus, the test focuses on “whether the [use of Brown’s likeness] would 
confuse [Madden NFL] players into thinking that [Brown] is somehow behind 
[the games] or that [he] sponsors [EA’s] product,” as well as “whether there 
was an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit misstatement’ that 
caused such consumer confusion.”125  The use of Brown’s likeness alone did 
not satisfy this test, nor did evidence showing that consumers believed that 
Brown endorsed Madden NFL.126  Instead, the court held that any “evidence 
must relate to the nature of the behavior of the identifying material’s user, not 
the impact of the use.”127 
The court’s findings regarding two specific materials Brown pointed to 
are of interest.  First, the court found EA’s statement that Madden NFL 
included “[f]ifty of the NFL’s greatest players and every All-Madden team” 
showed no attempt to mislead consumers because the statement was true.128  
Second, the court addressed a statement by EA officials saying “EA was able 
to use the images and likenesses of players because it obtained written 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 1243. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1243–44. 
 124. Id. at 1245. 
 125.  Id. (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 
2008) and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989)) (alterations in original). 
 126. See id. at 1245–46 (noting that Brown put forth several arguments to show that he satisfied the 
second prong of the Rogers test; however, his arguments were ultimately unsuccessful). 
 127. Id. at 1246. 
 128. Id. (alteration in original). 
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authorization from both the NFL players and the NFL.”129  The court found 
this was “perhaps the closest Brown [came] to offering evidence that EA acted 
in an explicitly misleading manner as to Brown’s endorsement of the game,” 
but it had no need to address whether the statement itself could be explicitly 
misleading because EA made the statement only to a limited audience.130  
Thus, Brown failed to show EA explicitly misled consumers regarding his 
involvement.131 
Brown clarified Ninth Circuit law on the intersection between the Lanham 
Act and the First Amendment in two important ways.  First, by expressly 
rejecting the likelihood of confusion and alternative means tests, the Ninth 
Circuit resolved any ambiguity that Textron might have caused regarding the 
role of alternative tests in the Rogers analysis.132  Second, the court clarified 
that the explicitly misleading prong of the Rogers test requires an “explicit 
indication,” “overt claim,” or “explicit misstatement” causing consumer 
confusion.133 
5. VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC 
Four years after Brown, the Ninth Circuit again applied the Rogers test in 
VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC.134  VIRAG was 
an Italian company and leader in the commercial flooring business.135  In 
2004, VIRAG began sponsoring the Rally of Monza race, which takes place 
on the Autodromo Nazionale Monza racetrack in Monza, Italy.136  VIRAG’s 
name and trademark began appearing in 2006 “on a bridge over the track on 
which the Rally of Monza occurs.”137  VIRAG also sponsored a car for one of 
 
 129. Id. at 1247. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 1248 (noting that the district court had discretion in deciding this issue in response 
to a motion to dismiss). 
 132. See id. at 1241–43. 
 133. Id. at 1245 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 134. See 699 F. App’x 667, 668 (9th Cir. 2017).  Because the Ninth Circuit issued a short 
memorandum opinion, this article takes the facts and analysis mainly from the Northern District of 
California’s order granting Sony’s motion to dismiss.  See VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t 
Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), aff’d, 699 F. App’x 
667 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 135. VIRAG, 2015 WL 5000102, at *1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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its owners, Mirco Virag, who competed in the Rally of Monza.138 
Meanwhile, Sony published the Gran Turismo series of racing games, 
which allowed players to drive simulations of real race cars on simulations of 
real race tracks.139  Sony introduced the Monza track in Gran Turismo 5, 
where it also displayed VIRAG’s trademark on a simulation of the bridge of 
the Monza track.140  Gran Turismo 6 also included the Monza track and the 
VIRAG mark.141 
VIRAG sued Sony, alleging claims under the Lanham Act.142  The district 
court granted Sony’s motion to dismiss these claims.143  The court rejected 
VIRAG’s argument that the games were not expressive works subject to First 
Amendment protection, finding that they have “characters (the race car 
drivers), plot (the drama of the races), and music.”144  The games also have 
“meaningful interaction between the game player and the virtual world: how 
else would a game player play the games?  By not interacting with them?”145  
Thus, just as Madden NFL was an expressive work, so too were the Gran 
Turismo games.146 
The district court also rejected VIRAG’s argument that the Rogers test 
did not apply because the VIRAG mark did not have cultural significance.147  
In a lengthy analysis, the court surveyed Ninth Circuit precedent from MCA 
Records to Brown and district court opinions from Rebelution to Mil-Spec 
Monkey and concluded that the Rogers test is not limited to culturally 
significant marks.148 
After disposing of these preliminary issues, the court applied the Rogers 
test.  Focusing on the goal of realism in Gran Turismo 5 and Gran Turismo 6, 
the court found Sony’s use of the VIRAG mark had artistic relevance because 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at *2. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at *1.  VIRAG and Mirco Virag also sued Sony for violating their rights of publicity.  Id. 
 143. See id. (dismissing VIRAG’s three claims with prejudice but denying Sony’s motion to dismiss 
Mirco Virag’s request for punitive damages). 
 144. Id. at *8. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at *9 (noting that the plaintiffs contended that the Rogers test did not apply because the 
VIRAG mark did not have “such cultural significance” that it has “become an integral part of our 
vocabulary”). 
 148. See id. at *9–10. 
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“the games seek to provide a realistic simulation of European car racing, 
including by allowing players to drive on realistic simulations of European 
race tracks (like the Monza Track).”149  The court then found “no plausible 
support” for VIRAG’s argument that Sony used the VIRAG mark to 
“explicitly mislead consumers as to the source or content of Gran Turismo 5 
or Gran Turismo 6.”150  VIRAG’s allegation that consumers might think 
VIRAG “provided expertise and knowledge for the games or sponsored them” 
because of its “involvement in the European racing scene” was not enough, 
since “[t]he focus of the second prong of the Rogers test is on whether the 
defendants explicitly mislead consumers as to the source or content of the 
work” and VIRAG had only alleged that Sony used the VIRAG mark.151  The 
court reiterated the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Brown “that a defendant must 
give an ‘explicit indication’ or make an ‘overt claim’ or ‘explicit 
misstatement’ that causes consumer confusion.”152 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit dispatched VIRAG’s arguments in a short, 
four paragraph memorandum opinion that included two important 
clarifications of the law: “The test set forth in [Rogers] applies regardless 
whether the VIRAG trademark has independent cultural significance, or 
Sony’s use of the trademark within the video game serves to communicate a 
message other than the source of the trademark.”153  In this single sentence, 
the Ninth Circuit dispelled any lingering doubts that Rebelution might have 
raised on these issues.154 
The Ninth Circuit continues to develop the Rogers test to this day, but its 
application to video games now appears well-settled. 155 
 
 149. Id. at *11. 
 150. Id. at *12 (italics added).  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at *13 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 153. VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 699 F. App’x 667, 668 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(citations omitted). 
 154. See Look Before You Leap: Trademark Decision Highlights Importance of Thorough Pre-
Litigation Assessment of Case, SPRINGUT LAW (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.springutlaw.com/blog/ 
2017/12/14/trademark-decision-highlights-importance-of-thorough-pre-litigation-assessment-of-case 
(“The Ninth Circuit’s affirmance rejected a controversial line of district-court cases that would have 
limited [the Rogers test] to cultural icons.”).  Curiously, despite clarifying these important aspects of 
the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit disposed of VIRAG’s appeal in an unpublished, non-precedential 
opinion.  See VIRAG, 699 F. App’x at 668, n.*. 
 155. See discussion supra Section III.C.  Other cases outside the video game context have further 
developed the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit.  See discussion supra Section III.C.3.  In a case 
involving a television series, the Ninth Circuit expanded the Rogers test to apply not only to content 
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D. Other Jurisdictions Applying the Rogers Test to Video Games 
Few courts outside the Ninth Circuit have addressed the Rogers test in the 
video game context.  For example, despite creating the Rogers test more than 
three decades ago, the Second Circuit so far has had no opportunity to apply 
it in the context of video games.  Nevertheless, the few decisions that do exist 
provide important data. 
1. AM General LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc. 
Since 2003, Activision has published the Call of Duty military action 
video game series, which has become one of the “most popular and well-
known video game franchises in the world.”156  In the Call of Duty games, the 
“player assumes control of a military soldier and fights against a computer-
controlled or human-controlled opponent across a variety of computer[-
]generated battlefields.”157  Each game depicts military combat in a realistic 
wartime setting, providing players with “very realistic and convincing . . . 
portrayal[s] of modern combat operations.”158  To provide this realism, the 
games use real-world locations and military organizations, uniforms, 
weapons, equipment, and vehicles actually used in the real world.159 
One of the vehicles included in the Call of Duty games is the Humvee.160  
The Humvee—the colloquial term for the High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)—has been “the backbone of U.S. defense 
tactical vehicle fleets around the world” and “an essential part of U.S. military 
 
within an expressive work, but also to promotional activities such as “appearances by cast members 
in other media, radio play, online advertising, live events, and the sale or licensing of consumer 
goods.”  See Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 
2017).  Twentieth Century Fox will likely be relevant to video game cases in which a plaintiff alleges 
the unauthorized use of a mark or likeness in advertising.  See id.  Further, in a case involving the use 
of trademarks on greeting cards, the Ninth Circuit raised additional considerations such as whether 
consumers would view a mark alone as identifying the source of the expressive work, the degree to 
which the user and the mark owner use the marks in the same way, and the extent to which the user 
adds its own expressive content to the work beyond the mark itself.  See Gordon v. Drape Creative, 
Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 2018).  These considerations might make sense in the context of 
products such as greeting cards, but they likely will rarely apply to video games.  See id. 
 156. AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 157. Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, 41 F. Supp. 3d 885, 890 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
 158. Id.; see also AM General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (stating the “first-person shooter series . . . is 
characterized by its realism, cinematic set-pieces, and fast-paced multiplayer mode”). 
 159. See Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 890. 
 160. See AM General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 475. 
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operations” for decades.161  “From Panama to Somalia, and to this day in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the Humvee has become an iconic and a ubiquitous symbol 
of the modern American military.”162  Nine Call of Duty games depict 
Humvees.163 
AM General, the producer of the Humvee and the owner of the Humvee 
and related trademarks, sued Activision.164  This case represented at least the 
third in a series against Activision for using trademarks in the Call of Duty 
series.165  In March 2020, the Southern District of New York applied the 
Rogers test and granted Activision’s motion for summary judgment.166 
The court recognized the artistic relevance requirement is “real, [but] not 
unduly rigorous out of the understanding that the ‘overextension of Lanham 
Act restrictions might intrude on First Amendment values.’”167  Activision’s 
use of the Humvee marks had artistic relevance because “[f]eaturing actual 
vehicles used by military operations around the world in video games about 
simulated modern warfare surely evokes a sense of realism and lifelikeness to 
the player who ‘assumes control of a military soldier and fights against a 
computer-controlled or human-controlled opponent across a variety of 
computer-generated battlefields.’”168  In short, the court found, “[i]f realism is 
an artistic goal, then the presence in modern warfare games of vehicles 
employed by actual militaries undoubtedly furthers that goal.”169  Moreover, 
“assuming arguendo that realism is the only artistic interest that Call of Duty 
games possess—an assumption potentially belied by the presence of narrative 
campaign modes in all of the challenged games—it is also true that realism 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 475–76. 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 476; Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 
1136 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff sued Activision over the use of an “angry monkey” 
mark in Call of Duty: Ghosts); Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 885, 888–
89 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that the plaintiff sued Activision over the use of the “Delta Force” word 
and design marks in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3). 
 166. See AM General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 479–80, 489. 
 167. Id. at 477. 
 168. Id. at 479 (quoting Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 890.  The court also adopted the reasoning in 
another case that found Activision’s use of a trademark in Call of Duty “easily met the artistic 
relevance requirement” because it “gave players a ‘sense of a particularized reality of being part of an 
actual elite special forces operation and serve[d] as a means to increase specific realism of the game.’”  
Id. (citing Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 900).  
 169. Id. at 484. 
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can have artistic merit in itself.”170 
To analyze the explicitly leading prong, the court applied the eight-factor 
analysis developed by the Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Electronics Corp. to determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed.171  
The Polaroid factors are the strength of the plaintiff’s trademark, “the degree 
of similarity between the two marks,” the proximity of the products and their 
competition with one another, “the likelihood that the senior user will enter 
the junior user’s market in the future,” evidence of actual confusion, the 
“defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark,” “the quality of the 
defendant’s product,” and the sophistication of consumers in the relevant 
market.172 
The court found the Polaroid factors weighed in Activision’s favor, with 
AM General showing only “the strength of its mark and a less than 20 percent 
risk of confusion.”173  In analyzing the good faith Polaroid factor, the court 
focused on “the intent to sow confusion between the two companies’ 
products” and found that neither “the presence of Humvees decorated with 
Call of Duty logos at several in-person promotional events” nor a boilerplate 
statement regarding intellectual property ownership included on user guides 
inside the Call of Duty games that did not mention Humvees “demonstrate[d] 
a desire to ‘sow confusion between the two companies’ products.’”174 
2. Romantics v. Activision Publishing 
In the mid-2000s, Activision began publishing the Guitar Hero series of 
video games, one of which included Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s.175  
In Rocks the 80s, players “choose among options such as character, costume, 
 
 170. Id. at 484–85. 
 171. Id. at 480–84 (applying the analysis of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp, 287 F.2d 492 (2d 
Cir. 1961).  Notably, this likelihood of confusion analysis drawn from Second Circuit precedent 
departs from the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which does not analyze likelihood of confusion.  See supra 
Part III.C.4. 
 172. Am General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 480–81(quoting Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495). 
 173. Id. at 484. 
 174. Id. at 482–83 (quoting Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 388 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 175. See Press Release Details: Activision Set to Acquire Video Game Publisher RedOctane and Its 
Highly Popular Guitar Hero Franchise, ACTIVISION, INC. (May 9, 2006), https://investor.activision. 
com/news-releases/news-release-details/activision-set-acquire-video-game-publisher-redoctane-and-
its.  RedOctane published the original Guitar Hero game in 2005, and Activision acquired RedOctane 
in 2006.  Id. 
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and model of guitar.”176  The game then allows “players to pretend they are 
playing guitar in a rock band” by simulating the “guitar play of various songs 
by correctly timing the pressing of fret buttons and strum bars on a guitar-like 
controller.”177 
Rocks the 80s contains “thirty songs from the 1980’s to add to the realistic 
experience of playing in a rock band from that era.”178  One of the songs is 
“What I Like About You,” originally recorded by The Romantics in 1979 and 
published in 1980.179  Activision obtained a valid, nonexclusive “synch 
license” from the owner of the copyright, which allowed Activision to “make 
a new recording of the underlying composition and to use that recording in 
synchronization with visual images in the video game to enable game play.”180  
As it appears in the game, the song is clearly identified by its title and the 
words, “as made famous by The Romantics.”181 
The band and its members sued Activision, alleging false endorsement 
under the Lanham Act and a violation of their right of publicity.182  On the 
false endorsement claim, the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary 
judgment for Activision after analyzing the Rogers test and finding the First 
Amendment protected Activision’s use of the song in Rocks the 80s.183 
The court discussed the “artistic merits” of Rocks the 80s and found 
Activision’s use of the song in the game was related to its purpose of allowing 
players to pretend they are in a rock band.184  Further, the court found the use 
did not explicitly mislead the public as to its source because the game and its 
promotional materials contained no “explicit indication” that The Romantics 
endorsed the game or had a role in producing it.185  Consumers do not 
encounter the song until after they purchase and play the game (and even then, 
they might not ever encounter it), and the game describes the song “as made 
famous by The Romantics,” thus informing the player that The Romantics did 
 
 176. Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 761.  
 183. Id. at 766–71. 
 184. Id. at 766, 769. 
 185. Id. at 769 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d. Cir. 1989)). 
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not actually perform the version of the song that appears in the game.186 
3. Dillinger v. Electronic Arts 
In 1969, Mario Puzo wrote the novel The Godfather, which Francis Ford 
Coppola later adapted into the The Godfather film trilogy.187  In the late 2000s, 
EA developed and published two video games, The Godfather and The 
Godfather II, based on the films.188  The first game “simulates the mafia world 
in New York during the mid-1900s,” where “[t]he player acts as a member of 
the Corleone family” and guides the character “through a variety of missions 
predicated on the plot of the original Godfather film.”189  In the second game, 
the player guides the character “along the same plot-line as the movies,” but 
also “aims to control criminal networks in New York, Miami, and Cuba during 
the 1960s.”190  Both games feature “period-appropriate vehicles and 
weapons,” including Thompson submachine guns, known as “Tommy Guns,” 
commonly associated with legendary criminal John Dillinger.191  In both 
games, a player “may choose and use a Tommy Gun identified as the Level 
Three ‘Dillinger Tommy Gun,’” one of fifteen firearms in the game.192  In the 
second game, a player can also purchase a “Modern Dillinger” and other 
weapons as part of a downloadable bundle.193 
Dillinger, LLC, which “claims to own the publicity rights” of John 
Dillinger and “the trademark rights in the words ‘John Dillinger,’” sued EA.194  
The Southern District of Indiana noted that the Seventh Circuit had not yet 
adopted the Rogers test, but since the parties agreed the Rogers test controlled 
EA’s First Amendment defense to Dillinger’s Lanham Act claims, the court 
“accept[ed] the parties’ position as to Rogers application, and assume[d] that 
Rogers control[led] without definitely deciding the question.”195 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Mario Puzo, THE GODFATHER (1969); THE GODFATHER (Paramount 1972); THE GODFATHER 
PART II (Paramount 1974); THE GODFATHER PART III (Paramount 1990); see Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. 
Arts Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011). 
 188. Dillinger, 2011 WL 2457678, at *2. 
 189. Id. at *3. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at *1–2. 
 195. Id. at *4 n.1. 
[Vol. 48: 425, 2021] Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
453 
Turning to the question of artistic relevance, the court found that Tommy 
Guns were relevant to the virtual world depicted in the games, and the 
“Dillinger name is closely associated with the Tommy Gun.”196  This 
connection was  
enough to satisfy the Rogers test: The gentleman-bandit, commonly 
known for his public persona as a “flashy gangster who dressed well, 
womanized, drove around in fast cars, and sprayed Tommy Guns,” 
has above-zero relevance to a game whose premise enables players 
to act like members of the mafia and spray Tommy Guns.197 
The court then addressed whether EA’s use of the Dillinger name 
explicitly misleads as to the source and content of the games.198  The court 
likely could have begun and ended its analysis with its finding that “plaintiff 
points to no explicit misrepresentation.”199  But the court also found “no 
evidence that any consumer bought the Godfather Games because of the 
Dillinger name,” which was “‘incidental to the overall story of the game’ and 
‘not the main selling point of the Game.’”200  And it found no evidence of any 
actual consumer confusion: “The Court cannot simply infer that the Dillinger 
name confuses the public, let alone that such confusion outweighs First 
Amendment concerns.”201 
IV. CASES BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION OF VIDEO 
GAMES WITH THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The above section discussed cases balancing the First Amendment with 
the Lanham Act, with every case finding that the First Amendment protects 
video games.  By contrast, this section discusses cases balancing the First 
Amendment with the right of publicity, with many finding against First 
Amendment protection. 
 
 196. Id. at *4–6. 
 197. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).  
 198. Id. at *6–8. 
 199. Id. at *8. 
 200. Id. at *7 (quoting E.S.S. Ent. 200, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 
2009)). 
 201. Id. at *7–8. 
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A. The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity refers to a person’s right “to control the commercial 
use of his or her identity” or likeness.202  According to the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he 
theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the 
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected 
from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”203 
The right of publicity originated from the right to privacy.204  The famous 
article “The Right to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 
1890,205 as well as early 20th century cases from New York and Georgia 
involving the unauthorized use of photographs in advertisements, set the stage 
for developing the right to privacy.206  But applying the privacy label to these 
cases became a stumbling block in cases where celebrities sued for the 
unauthorized use of their name or likeness.207  For example, in O’Brien v. 
Pabst Sales Co., a football player sued the Pabst beer company for using his 
photograph on an advertising calendar.208  The majority rejected the football 
player’s “invasion of privacy” case, while the dissent focused upon the 
commercial value of the player’s identity.209 
Twelve years after O’Brien, the Second Circuit became the first court to 
recognize a cause of action for violation of the right of publicity in Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.210  The court found that New 
 
 202. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 1.3 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY] (“Today it is 
possible to state with clarity that the right of publicity is simply this: it is the inherent right of every 
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”); So Are Games Coffee Mugs or 
What?, supra note 21, at 180 (“According to McCarthy and Schechter’s leading treatise on the subject, 
‘The right of publicity is simply the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial 
use of his or her identity.’”). 
 203. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (quoting Carson v. Here’s Johnny 
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
 204. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013).  For a more thorough history 
than discussed in this article, see THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, §§ 1:27–
1.36 (tracing development of right of publicity to the 21st century). 
 205. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 206. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902); see also Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 207. See THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, § 1:25. 
 208. 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 209. Id. at 168–71. 
 210. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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York’s common law protected a baseball player’s right in the publicity value 
of his photograph, and it coined “right of publicity” as the name of this right.211  
Law review articles by Melville Nimmer and William Prosser would further 
define and set the groundwork for the right to privacy and the right of 
publicity.212 
No federal right of publicity exists as of today; instead, thirty-three states 
recognize the right by statute, common law, or both, with varying 
formulations.213  As one example, California provides both a common law and 
a statutory right of publicity.  A plaintiff alleging a right of publicity claim 
under California common law must establish “(1) the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to 
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and 
(4) resulting injury.”214  Similarly, California’s right of publicity statute 
provides: 
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchase of, products, merchandise, goods or services, 
without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any 
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result 
thereof.215 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the right of publicity for the only time 
more than forty years ago in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.216  
There, a performer in a “human cannonball” act sued a television broadcasting 
company for broadcasting his entire 15-second performance without his 
permission.217  The Court found “the [s]tate’s interest in permitting a ‘right of 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 
(1954); William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 213. See THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, §§ 6.2, 6.6.  Attempts to enact 
a federal right of publicity statute have failed.  See Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect 
Tiger Woods?  An Analysis of Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of 
Publicity, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1210–11 (2004). 
 214. Local TV, LLC v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 889–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting 
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 215. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 2020). 
 216. 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977). 
 217. Id. at 563–64. 
[Vol. 48: 425, 2021] Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
456 
publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act 
in part to encourage such entertainment,”218 and held the First Amendment did 
not protect the broadcast of Zacchini’s entire performance because doing so 
“poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.”219  In 
so holding, however, the Court contrasted “the broadcast of petitioner’s entire 
performance” with “the unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of 
trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press,” finding the 
former “goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an 
entertainer.”220  The court found the “strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’” 
involves “not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the 
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very 
activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.”221  
Thus, Zacchini offered little guidance in cases involving depictions of 
individuals. 
B. Development of the Transformative Use Test in Right of Publicity Cases 
Following Zacchini, lower courts developed different tests to balance the 
First Amendment with the right of publicity.222  Some apply a form of the 
Rogers test to determine whether the use of a name or likeness is “wholly 
unrelated” to an expressive work or “simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”223  Others apply the 
transformative use test, which has become the dominant test used in right of 
publicity cases.224  California was the first to adopt the transformative use test, 
so this article begins there. 
 
 218. Id. at 573. 
 219. Id. at 575. 
 220. Id. at 576. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court 
has not addressed the question, and decisions from the lower courts are a conflicting mix of balancing 
tests and frameworks borrowed from other areas of free-speech doctrine.”). 
 223. Rogers v.Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (first quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979); then quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 
427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)). 
 224. See infra Sections IV.B.2–3, IV.C, IV.D.1–5. 
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1. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions 
In 1979, the California Supreme Court decided its seminal right of 
publicity case in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions.225  There, the 
successor in interest of actor Rudolph Valentino sued the creators of a 
biographical film that told a fictionalized version of Valentino’s life story.226  
Chief Justice Bird’s concurrence stated that the First Amendment provided a 
complete defense against the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim.227  Chief 
Justice Bird observed that “[c]ontemporary events, symbols and people are 
regularly used in fictional works,” and “[f]iction writers may be able to more 
persuasively, more accurately express themselves by weaving into the tale 
persons or events familiar to their readers.”228  She explained that “[n]o author 
should be forced into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly 
divorced from reality” to avoid facing a right of publicity claim.229 
The Chief Justice then stated that “an action for infringement of the right 
of publicity can be maintained only if the proprietary interests at issue clearly 
outweigh the value of free expression.”230  She applied that balancing inquiry 
and found that  
[w]hether the publication involved was factual and biographical or 
fictional, the right of publicity has not been held to outweigh the 
value of free expression.  Any other conclusion would allow reports 
and commentaries on the thoughts and conduct of public and 
prominent persons to be subject to censorship under the guise of 
preventing the dissipation of the publicity value of a person’s 
identity.231 
Thus, the First Amendment protected the use of Valentino’s name and 
likeness in the film.232 
 
 225. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 455. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 457–62 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
 228. Id. at 460 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 461 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
 231. Id. at 461–62 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
 232. Id. at 462 (Bird, C.J., concurring).  The court also found the First Amendment protected the 
use of Valentino’s name and likeness in advertisements for the film: “It would be illogical to allow 
respondents to exhibit the film but effectively preclude any advance discussion or promotion of their 
lawful enterprise.”  Id. 
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For many years after Guglielmi, California courts applied a robust First 
Amendment protection against right of publicity claims in the film context 
without applying a transformative use test.233  For example, in Dora v. 
Frontline Video, Inc., the court of appeal held the First Amendment protected 
a producer of a documentary about surfers in Malibu from a surfer’s claims 
for violation of his right of publicity.234  And in Polydoros v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., the court of appeal held the First Amendment 
protected a writer and director of a fictional film that included a character 
resembling the plaintiff as a child.235  The court noted that to succeed on his 
claims, the plaintiff “must establish a direct connection between the use of his 
name or likeness and a commercial purpose,” and the mere creation of an 
expressive work for financial gain did not satisfy that requirement.236 
2. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 
In 2001, the California Supreme Court adopted the transformative use test 
to a right of publicity claim.237  In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., the owner of the intellectual property rights in The Three 
Stooges sued an artist who had made a charcoal drawing of The Three Stooges 
and sold it as a lithograph and on t-shirts.238  The court found the artist had 
used the likenesses on “products, merchandise, or goods”—lithographs and t-
shirts—within the meaning of the California right of publicity statute.239  It 
then found the case before it did “not concern commercial speech” because 
the artist’s portraits were “expressive works and not an advertisement for or 
endorsement of a product.”240  The First Amendment applied even though the 
artist created the works for profit and for entertaining, and even though the art 
appeared on “a less conventional avenue of communications.”241 
The court did not stop at recognizing the “high degree of First 
Amendment protection for noncommercial speech about celebrities,” 
 
 233. See Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Polydoros v. 
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 234. Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791, 794.  
 235. Polydoros, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208. 
 236. Id. at 209–10. 
 237. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 238. Id. at 800–01. 
 239. Id. at 802. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 802, 804. 
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however, because not “all expression that trenches on the right of publicity 
receives such protection.”242  Instead, it analogized the right of publicity to 
copyright law and found the state “legislature ha[d] a rational basis for 
permitting celebrities and their heirs to control the commercial exploitation of 
the celebrity’s likeness.”243  Thus, it searched for a test to “distinguish between 
protected and unprotected expression.”244 
The court reviewed copyright law’s fair use doctrine and found that a 
“wholesale importation” of it “into right of publicity law would not be 
advisable” because several fair use factors are not “useful for determining 
whether the depiction of a celebrity likeness is protected by the First 
Amendment.”245  But the court nevertheless took the first factor, “the purpose 
and character of the use,” finding it “particularly pertinent to the task of 
reconciling the rights of free expression and publicity.”246  The court reasoned 
that  
[w]hen artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or 
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on 
the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond 
that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic 
labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist.247 
But “when a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only 
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to 
interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”248 
Thus, the court adopted the transformative use test:  
[W]hen an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or 
her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is 
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant 
transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive 
 
 242. Id. at 804.  
 243. Id. at 805.  Thus, it appears the California Supreme Court applied a rational basis test rather 
than a strict scrutiny test to the right of publicity.  Id.   
 244. Id. at 807. 
 245. Id. at 807–08. 
 246. Id. at 808. 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
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primarily from the celebrity’s fame.249 
The court then offered several factors to consider in applying the test: (1) 
“whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an 
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the 
celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question”;250 (2) 
whether the work is “primarily the defendant’s own expression” that is 
“something other than the likeness of the celebrity”;251 (3) “whether the literal 
and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work”;252 (4) 
whether “the marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive 
primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted,” or “from the creativity, 
skill, and reputation of the artist”;253 and (5) whether the “artist’s skill and 
talent is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional 
portrait of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame.”254 
Applying the transformative use test, the court found it could “discern no 
significant transformative or creative contribution” by the artist, that the 
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of 
creating literal, conventional depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit 
their fame,” and that “the marketability and economic value of [the artist’s] 
work derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.”255  Thus, 
the work failed the transformative use test.256 
3. Winter v. DC Comics 
Two years after Comedy III, the California Supreme Court applied the 
transformative use test to comic books in Winter v. DC Comics.257  DC Comics 
had published a “five-volume comic miniseries featuring ‘Jonah Hex,’ a 
 
 249. Id. at 810. 
 250. Id. at 809. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. at 810. 
 254. Id.  The Ninth Circuit in Keller viewed Comedy III as establishing these five factors.  See 
Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig), 724 F.3d 
1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Keller]. 
 255. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810–11. 
 256. Id. at 811. 
 257. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
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fictional comic book ‘anti-hero.’”258  “The series contains an outlandish plot, 
involving giant worm-like creatures, singing cowboys, and the ‘Wilde West 
Ranch and Music and Culture Emporium . . . .’”259  Three volumes referenced 
or featured the half-worm, half-human brothers Johnny and Edgar Autumn.260 
Musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter sued for violation of their right of 
publicity.261  The court applied the transformative use test it had adopted in 
Comedy III and found (1) the comic books “are not just conventional 
depictions of plaintiffs but contain significant expressive content other than 
plaintiffs’ mere likenesses,” (2) plaintiffs are not depicted literally, but are 
“merely part of the raw materials from which the comic books were 
synthesized,” (3) any resemblance of plaintiffs is “distorted for purposes of 
lampoon, parody, or caricature,” (4) “the Autumn brothers are but cartoon 
characters—half-human and half-worm—in a larger story, which is itself 
quite expressive,” and (5) the Winters’ “fans who want to purchase pictures 
of them would find the drawings of the Autumn brothers unsatisfactory as a 
substitute for conventional depictions.”262  Thus, the court concluded, the 
comic books were “transformative and entitled to First Amendment 
protection.”263 
The court distinguished its earlier decision in Comedy III:  
The artist in [Comedy III] essentially sold, and devoted fans bought, 
pictures of The Three Stooges, not transformed expressive works by 
the artist.  Here, by contrast, defendants essentially sold, and the 
buyers purchased, DC Comics depicting fanciful, creative characters, 
not pictures of the Winter brothers.  This makes all the difference.264 
 
 
 258. Id. at 476. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 479. 
 263. Id. at 480.  The court further found that whether DC Comics was “trading on plaintiffs’ 
likenesses and reputations to generate interest” in the comic books was irrelevant, since “[t]he question 
[was] whether the work is transformative, not how it is marketed.”  Id. at 479. 
 264. Id. at 480.  As Professor Ford explains, the court’s analysis and conclusion allow one to read 
Winter as requiring “significant visual changes to a real person in order to qualify as transformative, 
which makes it risky to provide realistic portrayals of real people in comic books.”  So Are Games 
Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 186. 
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C. California State Cases Applying the Transformative Use Test to Video 
Games 
1. Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. 
Not only was California the first jurisdiction to adopt the transformative 
use test in right of publicity cases, it was also the first to apply the test in the 
video game context when the California Court of Appeal decided Kirby v. 
Sega of America, Inc.265  Kierin Kirby, “the lead singer of a retro-funk-dance 
musical group known as ‘Deee-Lite’ which was popular in the early 1990’s,” 
claimed Sega used her likeness as the basis for the character Ulala in Space 
Channel 5, a video game first released in Japan in 1999.266  Space Channel 5 
is “set in outer space in the 25th century” and features Ulala, “who works for 
a news channel called Space Channel 5.”267  “In the game, Ulala is dispatched 
to investigate an invasion of Earth by dance-loving aliens who shoot 
earthlings with ray guns, causing them to dance uncontrollably.”268  She 
“encounters the aliens and competitor reporters” during her investigation and 
must “match the dance moves of the other characters.”269 
After recognizing that “[v]ideo games are expressive works entitled to as 
much First Amendment protection as the most profound literature,” the court 
of appeal applied the transformative use test to Kirby’s right of publicity 
claim.270  The court described the “inquiry [as] whether the celebrity likeness 
is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or 
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.”271 
The court of appeal first noted similarities between Ulala and Kirby’s 
appearances: they were both “thin” with “similarly shaped eyes and faces, red 
lips and red or pink hair,” and both wore “brightly-colored, form-fitting 
clothing, including short skirts and platform shoes in a 1960’s retro style.”272  
 
 265. See 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 266. Id. at 609.  
 267. Id. at 610.  
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 615–16.  
 271. Id. at 615 (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 
2001)). 
 272. Id. at 613. 
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Moreover, “Ulala’s name is a phonetic variant of ‘ooh la la,’ a phrase often 
used by Kirby and associated with Kirby,” and Ulala and Kirby both use some 
of the same words and phrases, such as “groove,” “meow,” “dee-lish,” and “I 
won’t give up.”273 
But the court also found significant differences between the two.274  Their 
physiques were different, and Ulala’s appearance was based on the Japanese 
anime style.275  Ulala’s hairstyle and clothing also “differ[ed] from those worn 
by Kirby.”276  Further, Space Channel 5 is set in 25th century outer space, 
while “Kirby’s fashion approach harkens back to a retro 1960’s style, and 
neither her videos nor photographs relate to outer space.”277  Finally, a 
Japanese choreographer and dancer had created Ulala’s dance moves, which 
were different than Kirby’s.278 
The court concluded that “notwithstanding certain similarities, Ulala is 
more than a mere likeness or literal depiction of Kirby.”279  The differences 
between Ulala and Kirby “demonstrate Ulala is ‘transformative,’” and Sega 
“added creative elements to create a new expression.”280  Thus, “Ulala 
contains sufficient expressive content to constitute a ‘transformative work’ 
under the test articulated by the [California] Supreme Court,” and the First 
Amendment protected the game from Kirby’s right of publicity claim.281 
2. No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc. 
Five years after Kirby, a different division of the California Court of 
Appeal282 reached the opposite result in another video game case, No Doubt 
v. Activision Publishing, Inc., in which the rock band No Doubt sued 
Activision over the use of the bandmembers’ likenesses in Band Hero.283  
 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 613, 616. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 616.  
 277. Id. at 613. 
 278. Id. at 609.  
 279. Id. at 616. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. “The California Courts of Appeal are divided into six appellate districts,” some of which “are 
further divided into Divisions.”  California Courts of Appeal, CALIFORNIA COURTS, 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
 283. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  More specifically, No Doubt had “licensed 
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Band Hero is a “version of Activision’s Guitar Hero franchise” that “allows 
players to simulate performing in a rock band in time with popular songs.”284  
Band Hero contains more than sixty popular songs and also “permits players 
to create their own music.”285  Players perform the songs by using avatars to 
represent them, which they can design themselves or choose from among ones 
already available, including “fictional characters created and designed by 
Activision” as well as “digital representations of real-life rock stars.”286 
The court held that Activision’s use of No Doubt’s likenesses in Band 
Hero was not transformative.287  It found Activision used “literal 
reproductions” of the likenesses “so that players could choose to ‘be’ the No 
Doubt rock stars,” and that Band Hero did not allow players “to alter the No 
Doubt avatars”; instead, “they remain at all times immutable images of the 
real celebrity musicians.”288  Although the court recognized that “even literal 
reproductions of celebrities can be ‘transformed’ into expressive works based 
on the context into which the celebrity image is placed,”289 it found the 
“context in which Activision uses the literal likenesses of No Doubt’s 
members does not qualify the use of the likenesses for First Amendment 
protection.”290 
The court found that, unlike Sega’s portrayal of Ulala in Space Channel 
5 as a news reporter in the 25th century, the No Doubt avatars in Band Hero 
“perform rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and 
maintains its fame,” and they did so “as literal recreations of the band 
members.”291  The court rejected Activision’s argument that its use of the 
likenesses was transformative because the avatars could perform at “fanciful 
venues including outer space,” perform songs “the real band would object to 
singing,” and that the likenesses appear “in the context of a videogame that 
contains many other creative elements.”292  In short, the court zeroed in on its 
 
the likenesses of its members for use in Band Hero,” but alleged “that Activision used [their likenesses] 
in objectionable ways outside the scope of the parties’ licensing agreement.”  Id.  
 284. Id. at 401.  Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc. discussed the Guitar Hero games.  574 F. 
Supp. 2d. 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 285. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401.  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 410–12, 415. 
 288. Id. at 409–10.  
 289. Id. at 410 (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001)). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 411. 
 292. Id. 
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finding that the avatars were “exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing 
exactly what they do as celebrities.”293 
Moreover, the court found that Activision’s use of No Doubt’s likenesses 
was “motivated by the commercial interest in using the band’s fame to market 
Band Hero, because it encourages the band’s sizeable fan base to purchase the 
game so as to perform as, or alongside, the members of No Doubt.”294  
According to the court, “insofar as the depiction of No Doubt is concerned, 
the graphics and other background content of the game are secondary, and the 
expressive elements of the game remain ‘manifestly subordinated to the 
overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of [No Doubt] so as to 
commercially exploit [its] fame.’”295  “In other words, nothing in the creative 
elements of the Band Hero elevates the depictions of No Doubt to something 
more than ‘conventional, more or less fungible, images’ of its members that 
No Doubt should have the right to control and exploit.”296 
3. Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. 
This article previously discussed ESS’s lawsuit over Rockstar’s depiction 
of a strip club in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.297  In Washington v. Take-
Two Interactive Software, Inc., Michael Washington, a “professional model” 
and “back-up singer . . . in the . . . rap group ‘Cypress Hill,’” sued Rockstar 
“alleging that [it] misappropriated his likeness and identity for the [main] 
character” in San Andreas, Carl Johnson (CJ).298 
The court of appeal began by describing San Andreas as “essentially an 
animated, interactive movie.”299  Applying the transformative use test, the 
court found that CJ was “‘not a literal depiction’ of Washington,”300 since CJ’s 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 
797, 811 (Cal. 2001)). 
 296. Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808).  In Romantics, the Eastern District of Michigan 
applied the Rogers test to another band’s right of publicity claim in a case involving the use of a song 
in Activision’s Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s—a game very similar to Band Hero—and found 
the First Amendment protected the game.  See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 
758, 765–766 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 297. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008); see supra notes 
76–96 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
 298. No. B232929, 2012 WL 5358709, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012). 
 299. Id. at *1. 
 300. Id. at *11 (quoting Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). 
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“appearance is rather ‘generic’” and “there is not a single feature that ‘directly 
links’ CJ to Washington, such as ‘distinctive tattoos, birthmarks or other 
physical features.’”301  Further, CJ’s “physical appearance changes during the 
game depending on the amount he exercises and the amount he eats,” and 
nothing suggests that “CJ’s clothing or accessories, which also change 
throughout the game, are based on Washington’s appearance.”302 
Further, the court found San Andreas had “significant creative elements 
that have no apparent connection to Washington.”303  The game takes place in 
different cities, where “CJ encounters dozens (if not hundreds) of characters, 
including police officers, drug dealers, gang members and members of his 
own family.”304  Throughout the game, CJ also “confront[s] many social 
issues, including police corruption, race relations, drug dealing, and gang 
culture.”305  And none of the locations, characters, or events in San Andreas 
were based on Washington’s life.306  The court also held that even if Rockstar 
had used Washington’s likeness, “CJ is a ‘fanciful, creative character’ who 
exists in the context of a unique and expressive video game,’” like Ulala was 
in Kirby, and therefore any use would not have been the “very sum and 
substance” of San Andreas, but just “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which 
[the game] is synthesized.”307 
Finally, the court of appeal distinguished the case before it from No 
Doubt, finding that Washington had “presented no evidence demonstrating 
that the plot or characters” of San Andreas had “any relevance to his life or 
his purported fame,”308 whereas in No Doubt, the court had found the avatars 
were “exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as 
celebrities.”309 
 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. (first quoting Kirby. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); then 
quoting Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003)). 
 308. Id. at *12. 
 309. Id. (quoting No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011)). 
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4. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard 
This article previously discussed AM General’s lawsuit over Activision’s 
use of Humvees in the Call of Duty series, and mentioned two other district 
court cases in which plaintiffs sued for trademark infringement over Call of 
Duty.310  In 2014, Manuel Noriega sued Activision over the use of his likeness 
in Call of Duty: Black Ops II.311  Noriega was a former general in the 
Panamanian army and former dictator of Panama, who “controlled all 
elements of the Panamanian government” and was involved in drug 
trafficking, money laundering, and arms dealing.312  A series of escalations 
between Panama and the United States led to Operation Just Cause—the U.S. 
invasion of Panama—in 1989.313  Noriega was later convicted in the United 
States, Panama, and France of various offenses, and he died in 2017.314 
The superior court dismissed Noriega’s right of publicity claim, focusing 
on several facts.315  In Black Ops II, players “assume the role of a foot soldier 
placed in simulated infantry and warfare scenarios.”316  “[T]he game is set in 
the context of the Cold War and incorporates clandestine CIA operations 
driven by specialized Black Ops soldiers . . . .”317  The Noriega character in 
Black Ops II appeared in only two of the eleven missions for “a matter of 
minutes and voice[d] less than 30 lines” and was just “one of more than 45 
characters, including other historical figures.”318  Moreover, players “can 
never assume the Noriega character’s identity, control its movements or 
experience gameplay through its eyes.”319  Activision “devoted two years, 
over $100 million and a team of over 250 designers, engineers and talent to 
 
 310. See supra notes 156–174 and accompanying text. 
 311. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *1 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 27, 2014).  The caption in the order misspells Noriega’s name as Noreiga, but the register of 
actions reflects the correct spelling of his name.  See id. 
 312. Id. at *3. 
 313. See id. 
 314. See id.; see also Randal C. Archibold, Manuel Noriega, Dictator Ousted by U.S. in Panama, 
Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/world/americas/ 
manuel-antonio-noriega-dead-panama.html. 
 315. Noriega, 2014 WL 5930149, at *3; see also infra notes 316–322 and accompanying text 
(discussing the facts the court focused on). 
 316. Noriega, 2014 WL 5930149, at *3. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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develop and produce” the game,320 and it did not use the Noriega character “in 
any marketing or advertising of the game.”321 
The court found that 
this evidence compels the conclusion that [Activision’s] use of 
Noriega’s likeness was transformative.  The publicly available 
photographs of Noriega used to create his avatar were part of the 
extensive “raw materials” from which the game was synthetized.  
Noriega’s depiction was not the “very sum and substance” of the 
work.  The complex and multi-faceted game is a product of 
defendants’ own expression, with de minimis use of Noriega’s 
likeness. . . . [T]he marketability and economic value of the [game] 
. . . comes not from Noriega, but from the creativity, skill and 
reputation of [Activision].322 
5. A Non-Video Game Case for Comparison: de Havilland v. FX 
Networks, LLC 
In de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, actress Olivia de Havilland alleged 
the creators and producers of Feud: Bette and Joan violated her right of 
publicity.323  Feud is a “docudrama about film stars Bette Davis and Joan 
Crawford,” in which Catherine Zeta-Jones portrays de Havilland, “a close 
friend of Davis.”324 
The court of appeal first concluded that the First Amendment protected 
FX’s use of de Havilland’s likeness in Feud even without applying the 
transformative use test.325  Citing Sarver v. Chartier, the court found Feud “is 
speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment, which safeguards the 
storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life—including the 
stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary—and transform them into 
 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at *4.  As Professor Ford has explained, the Noriega court’s focus on the game as a whole 
is consistent with Comedy III, but inconsistent with No Doubt.  See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or 
What?, supra note 21, at 197–98.  But Noriega apparently did not appeal the superior court’s decision, 
so the court of appeal lacked the opportunity to address the inconsistency between the trial court’s 
decision and No Doubt. 
 323. 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019). 
 324. Id. at 630–31. 
 325. See id. at 638. 
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art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays.”326  The court provided several 
examples where creators of expressive works could portray real people 
without acquiring their rights:  
The creators of The People v. O.J. Simpson: American Crime Story 
can portray Trial Judge Lance Ito without acquiring his rights.  
Fruitvale Station’s writer and director Ryan Coogler can portray Bay 
Area Rapid Transit officer Johannes Mehserle without acquiring his 
rights.  HBO can portray Sarah Palin in Game Change (HBO 2013) 
without acquiring her rights.327 
Turning to the transformative use test, the court first questioned its 
applicability to films: “Comedy III’s ‘transformative’ test makes sense when 
applied to products and merchandise—‘tangible personal property,’ in the 
Supreme Court’s words.  Lower courts have struggled mightily, however, to 
figure out how to apply it to expressive works such as films, plays, and 
television programs.”328  Nevertheless, the court applied the test and disagreed 
with the trial court’s finding that there was “nothing transformative about the 
docudrama” simply because FX “wanted to make the appearance of [de 
Havilland] as real as possible.”329 
The court of appeal pointed out several factors that made the use 
transformative.  First, “[t]he de Havilland role . . . constitutes about 4.2 percent 
of Feud,” a miniseries that focuses on the competition between Bette Davis 
and Joan Crawford but also tells many other stories.330  Second, FX used de 
Havilland’s likeness as “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which [the] original 
work [Feud] [was] synthesized,” and “Feud’s ‘marketability and economic 
value’ [did] not ‘derive primarily from [de Havilland’s] fame’ but rather 
‘[came] principally from . . . the creativity, skill, and reputation’ of Feud’s 
 
 326. Id. (quoting Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 327. Id. at 639.  Likewise, “[y]ou are entitled to write (and sell) your own unauthorized biography 
of Arnold Schwarzenegger, whether or not there’s already an authorized biography that adequately 
covers the territory.”  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 903, 923 (2003); cf. Restoring Rogers, supra note 21, at 312 (discussing the use of trademarks 
in films). 
 328. de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 641 (citation omitted) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001)). 
 329. Id. (alteration in original). 
 330.  Id. 
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creators and actors.”331  In short, the court found, “Feud constitutes 
‘significant expression’—a story of two Hollywood legends—of which the de 
Havilland character is but a small part.”332 
D. Federal Cases Applying the Transformative Use Test to Video Games 
Several federal cases have applied the transformative use test to right of 
publicity claims in video games.  Three discussed below involve the use of 
likenesses in realistic sports games and have shifted the law greatly towards 
protecting the right of publicity at the cost of the First Amendment.  The other 
two found the use of an individual’s likeness sufficiently transformed, but 
only in games where realism was not a goal. 
1. Hart v. Electronic Arts 
In EA’s NCAA Football, players can choose a “basic single-game format” 
where two college football teams play against each other, or other game 
modes such as the “Dynasty Mode” that “allows [players] to ‘control[] a 
college program for up to thirty seasons,’ including ‘year-round 
responsibilities of a college coach’”; or the “Race for the Heisman” (or 
“Campus Legend”) mode that allows players to control a virtual high school 
football player “through his collegiate career, making his or her own choices 
regarding practices, academics and social activities.”333 
NCAA Football owed its success to “its focus on realism and detail—from 
realistic sounds, to game mechanics, to team mascots.”334  As part of that 
realism, the game has “‘over 100 virtual teams’ . . . populated by digital 
avatars that resemble their real-life counterparts and share their vital and 
biographical information.”335  Players can change an avatar’s appearance and 
vital statistics, but other details remain unchangeable.336  “Thus, for example, 
in NCAA Football 2006, Rutgers’ quarterback, player number 13, is 6’2” tall, 
weighs 197 pounds and resembles [Ryan] Hart,” a quarterback, player number 
 
 331. Id. (first, second, fifth, and seventh alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 
810). 
 332. Id. 
 333. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original). 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
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13, who played for Rutgers “for the 2002 through 2005 seasons.”337  And Hart 
sued EA for using his likeness and biographical information in NCAA 
Football under New Jersey’s right of publicity law.338 
The Third Circuit surveyed the different tests that courts used over the 
years to balance First Amendment protections with right of publicity 
claims.339  It analyzed whether to apply “the commercial-interest-based 
Predominant Use Test, the trademark-based Rogers Test, [or] the copyright-
based Transformative Use Test.”340  In a lengthy analysis, the court declined 
to adopt either of the first two and instead opted to apply the transformative 
use test.341 
Applying the transformative use test, the court focused on “whether 
[Hart’s] identity is sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football.”342  First, it 
found the “digital avatar’s appearance and the biographical and identifying 
information” closely resembled Hart.343  Second, the court found the avatar 
“does what the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college 
football, in digital recreations of college football stadiums, filled with all the 
trappings of a college football game.”344  The court found these elements were 
not transformative because they did not change Hart’s “identity in a 
significant way.”345  Third, the court found the players’ ability to alter the 
avatar’s appearance insufficient to meet the transformative use test because 
EA’s goal in NCAA Football was to “create a realistic depiction of college 
football,” part of which “involves generating realistic representations of the 
various college teams—which includes the realistic representations of the 
players.”346  Because realism is “central to the core of the game experience,” 
the ability for players to change the avatar’s appearance was not enough to 
transform Hart’s likeness.347  Finally, the court rejected EA’s argument that 
other creative elements of NCAA Football should be considered, and limited 
 
 337. Id. at 146, 145. 
 338. Id. at 145. 
 339. See id. at 152–65. 
 340. Id. at 153. 
 341. Id. at 153–65. 
 342. Id. at 165. 
 343. Id. at 166. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id.  
 346. Id. at 168. 
 347. Id. 
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its analysis only to elements of the game that “in some way[] affect the use or 
meaning of [Hart’s] identity.”348 
Judge Ambro dissented.349  He made two key points.  First, he found the 
majority unduly limited “their transformative inquiry to Hart’s identity alone, 
disregarding other features of the work.”350  Rather, in applying the 
transformative use test, “it is necessary to review the likeness in the context 
of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on the individual’s 
likeness.”351 
Second, Judge Ambro found the majority had “penalize[d] EA for the 
realism and financial success of NCAA Football,” and that decision cannot be 
reconciled with “First Amendment protections traditionally afforded to true-
to-life depictions of real figures and works produced for profit.”352  The First 
Amendment protects “biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other 
expressive works depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts are factual 
or fictional.”353  Moreover, the sale of expressive works for profit does not 
diminish First Amendment protections, which apply equally to video games 
as to other expressive works.354 
Thus, EA’s use of real-life likenesses as “characters” in its NCAA 
Football video game should be as protected as portrayals (fictional 
or nonfictional) of individuals in movies and books. . . .  And . . . 
[any] profit flow[ing] from EA’s realistic depiction of Hart (and the 
myriad other college football players portrayed in NCAA Football) is 
not constitutionally significant, nor even an appropriate 
consideration.355 
Applying his understanding of the transformative use test, Judge Ambro 
concluded that “EA’s use of avatars resembling actual players is entitled to 
First Amendment protection.”356  He referenced the “original graphics, videos, 
sound effects, and game scenarios” in the game; players’ ability “to direct the 
 
 348. Id. at 169. 
 349. Id. at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 354. Id. at 173–74 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 355. Id. at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 356. Id. 
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play of a college football team whose players may be based on a current roster, 
a past roster, or an entirely imaginary roster comprised of made-up players”; 
that players “are not reenacting real games, but rather are directing the avatars 
in invented games and seasons”; and that players can “control virtual players 
and teams for multiple seasons, creating the means by which they can generate 
their own narratives.”357 
2. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation 
(Keller) 
At the same time the Third Circuit considered Hart, the Ninth Circuit 
faced a materially identical case in Keller, where several college football 
players (including Samuel Keller) sued EA for using their likenesses in NCAA 
Football.358  Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Rogers test 
in favor of the transformative use test.359  It identified five factors from the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Comedy III to analyze in determining 
whether the use of a likeness is sufficiently transformative.360  Ultimately, the 
court’s analysis mirrored that of the Third Circuit’s in Hart, and it reached the 
same conclusion—that EA’s use of college football players’ likenesses in 
NCAA Football was not transformative because “NCAA Football realistically 
portrays college football players in the context of college football games.”361 
In yet another similarity, Judge Thomas dissented in Keller just as Judge 
Ambro dissented in Hart.362  Judge Thomas found the First Amendment 
protected NCAA Football “because the creative and transformative elements” 
of the game “predominate over the commercial use of the athletes’ 
likenesses.”363  Judge Thomas argued that the “majority confines its inquiry 
to how a single athlete’s likeness is represented in the video game, rather than 
examining the transformative and creative elements in the video game as a 
 
 357. Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 358. Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 
724 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 359. Id. at 1279–82.  The Ninth Circuit found that the “history and development of the Rogers test 
makes clear[] [that] it was designed to protect consumers from the risk of consumer confusion,” and 
“[t]he right of publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer.”  Id. at 1280–81. 
 360. Id. at 1274.  For the five factors, see supra notes 250–254 and accompanying text. 
 361. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279. 
 362. Id. at 1284 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 363. Id. 
[Vol. 48: 425, 2021] Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
474 
whole.”364  According to Judge Thomas, the majority’s approach “contradicts 
the holistic analysis required by the transformative use test,”365 which asks 
“whether the entire work is transformative, and whether the transformative 
elements predominate, rather than whether an individual persona or image has 
been altered.”366 
Judge Thomas described NCAA Football as a “work of interactive 
historical fiction” that allows the player to roleplay as a potential college 
football player or a football coach.367  The game also gives the player the 
power to alter the virtual players’ “abilities, appearances, and physical 
characteristics,” and even “create new virtual players.”368  Moreover, players 
can change teams and environmental factors such as “weather, crowd noise, 
[and] mascots.”369  Even if the player simply plays an unaltered version of the 
game, “the work is one of historic[al] fiction” because the “gamer controls the 
teams, players, and games.”370  Thus, “considered as a whole,” NCAA Football 
is “primarily one of EA’s own expression,” with “[t]he athletic likenesses . . . 
[merely] one of the raw materials from which the broader game is 
constructed.”371  Indeed, the “creative and transformative elements 
predominate over the commercial use of likenesses”; the “marketability and 
economic value of the game comes from” its “creative elements, not from . . .  
[any] commercial exploitation of a celebrity”; and “[t]he game is not a 
conventional portrait of a celebrity, but a work consisting of many creative 
and transformative elements.”372 
Moreover, Judge Thomas found the depiction of football players in NCAA 
Football more akin to the depiction of Ulala in Kirby than to the depiction of 
the band in No Doubt.373  While he distinguished No Doubt on the ground that 
the “literal representations in No Doubt were not, and could not be, 
transformed in any way,”374 he also noted that, “to the extent that the Court of 
 
 364. Id. at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 365. Id. (citing Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170–76 (3d. Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., 
dissenting)). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 1286. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. at 1286–87. 
 374. Id. at 1286. 
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Appeal’s opinion in No Doubt may be read to be in tension with the 
transformative use test as articulated by the California Supreme Court in 
Comedy III and Winter, it must yield.”375  Thus, Judge Thomas “would not 
punish EA for the realism of its games and for the skill of the artists who 
created realistic settings for the football games.”376 
Judge Thomas went even further.  Among other things, he focused on 
Comedy III’s requirement that courts examine “whether the source of the 
product marketability comes from creative elements or from pure exploitation 
of a celebrity image.”377  “NCAA Football includes not just Sam Keller, but 
thousands of virtual actors,” and “one could play NCAA Football thousands 
of times without ever encountering a particular avatar.”378  The “sheer number 
of athletes involved inevitably diminish[es] the significance of the publicity 
right at issue” and “underscores the inappropriateness of analyzing the right 
of publicity through the lens of one likeness only.”379 
Finally, Judge Thomas warned that “[t]he logical consequence of the 
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no matter how 
incidental, are protected by a state law right of publicity regardless of the 
creative context.”380  This result would “jeopardize[] the creative use of 
historic figures in motion pictures, books, and sound recordings,” and “cannot 
be reconciled with the many cases affording such works First Amendment 
protection.”381 
 
 375. Id. at 1287 n.3. 
 376. Id. at 1287. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 1287–88. 
 379. Id.  Judge Thomas’s discussion of No Doubt, unfortunately, is inaccurate.  See id. at 1288.  He 
suggests “Kirby and No Doubt involved pivotal characters in a video game” where “[t]he commercial 
image of the celebrities in each case was central to the production, and its contact with the consumer 
was immediate and unavoidable.”  Id.  That was true in Kirby since Ulala is the main protagonist in 
Space Channel 5.  Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  But in 
No Doubt, players could play Band Hero without ever encountering the likenesses of No Doubt’s 
members, who represented only one of the many choices players had in deciding upon the avatars to 
represent their band.  See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
 380. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 381. Id.  The majority responded that its analysis “leaves room for distinguishing between this 
case—where we have emphasized EA’s primary emphasis on reproducing reality—and cases 
involving other kinds of expressive works.”  Id. at 1279 n.10.  This very statement suggests there is a 
distinction between video games and other expressive works and shows the majority views video 
games as less deserving of First Amendment protection than those other works.  See infra Section V.B. 
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3. Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
Davis v. Electronic Arts, in which former NFL players sued EA for using 
their likenesses in Madden NFL,382 is nearly identical to Brown v. Electronic 
Arts.383  But while Brown sued under the Lanham Act,384 the plaintiffs in Davis 
sued under a state law right of publicity theory.385  And that made all the 
difference: The Ninth Circuit found the facts and arguments were largely 
indistinguishable from Keller, and held it was bound by its previous 
decision.386  Thus, the court declined to apply the Rogers test, and instead 
applied the transformative use test and concluded EA’s use of the players’ 
likenesses in Madden NFL was not transformative.387 
4. Hamilton v. Speight 
In Hamilton v. Speight, Lenwood Hamilton, a former professional 
wrestler and football player, alleged the publishers of the Gears of War video 
games used his wrestling identity Hard Rock Hamilton to create the character 
Augustus Cole.388  “Gears of War is an extremely violent cartoon-style fantasy 
video game series.  The series takes place on an Earth-like planet called Sera 
that is populated by a wide variety of post-apocalyptic, crumbling 
structures.”389  The games mainly follow “a military unit called Delta Squad,” 
which includes Cole, and its conflicts with “a race of exotic reptilian 
humanoids known as the Locust Horde.”390 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied the transformative use test 
 
 382. Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 383. Compare Davis, 775 F.3d at 1175 (“We are called upon to balance the right of publicity of 
former professional football players against Electronic Arts’ (EA) First Amendment right to use their 
likenesses in its Madden NFL series of video games.”), with Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 
1238 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[R]etired professional football player Jim[] Brown[] . . . alleg[ed] that 
Electronic Arts, Inc., violated § 43 of the Lanham Act through the use of his likeness in its Madden 
NFL series of video games.”). 
 384. Brown, 724 F.3d at 1238. 
 385. Davis, 775 F.3d at 1176. 
 386. Id. at 1178. 
 387. Id. at 1177–79. 
 388. Hamilton v. Speight, 413 F. Supp. 3d 423, 425–27 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d, No. 19-3495, 2020 
WL 5569454 (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2020). 
 389. Id. at 426. 
 390. Id.  
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and found Cole was transformative for two reasons.391  First, while Hamilton 
and Cole shared some physical similarities, Hamilton’s identity was 
“obviously not the ‘very sum and substance’ of the Cole character’s 
identity.”392  Cole’s biographical information, clothing, and persona were all 
different from Hamilton’s.393  “Second, the context in which the Cole 
character appears and performs is profoundly transformative” because Cole 
“engages in extraordinarily stylized and fantastical violence against 
cartoonish reptilian humanoids on a fictional planet in a fictional war [and] 
‘does not do[] what the actual’ . . . Hamilton . . . does—engage in professional 
wrestling on Earth.”394  In short, the court found, the case before it was nearly 
identical to Kirby.395 
In a short unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s order.396  The court found that “no reasonable jury could conclude that 
Hamilton—whether Lenwood or Hard Rock—is the ‘sum and substance’ of 
the Augustus Cole character.”397  Although it found some similarities, it also 
found other “significant differences” that “reveal that Hamilton was, at most, 
one of the ‘raw materials from which [Augustus Cole] was synthesized.’”398  
In particular, Hamilton does not “fight[] a fantastic breed of creatures in a 
fictional world,” has never served in the military, and “admits that the Cole 
character’s persona is alien to him.”399  In short, the Third Circuit concluded, 
“[i]f Hamilton was the inspiration for Cole, the likeness has been ‘so 
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression.’”400 
5. Pellegrino v. Epic Games, Inc. 
In 2017, Epic Games released the battle royale game Fortnite.401  The 
battle royale genre “blends the survival, exploration and scavenging elements 
of a survival game with last-man-standing gameplay,” where “‘up to 100 
 
 391. Id. at 431. 
 392. Id. at 431; see also id. at 431–33 (discussing this holding in more detail). 
 393. Id. at 431–32. 
 394. Id. at 431 (second alteration in original). 
 395. See id. at 432. 
 396. Hamilton v. Speight, No. 19-3495, 2020 WL 5569454 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2020). 
 397. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. at *3. 
 401. Pellegrino v. Epic Games, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 3d 373, 378 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 
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players, alone, in pairs or in groups, compete to be the last player or group 
alive’ by using weapons and other forms of violence to eliminate other 
players.”402  In 2018 and 2019, numerous plaintiffs sued Epic claiming it used 
their dance moves as emotes403 in Fortnite without permission.404  The initial 
battle resulted in the plaintiffs withdrawing their copyright claims, and some 
plaintiffs dismissing their cases altogether.405  A few, however, continued to 
pursue their trademark and right of publicity claims—including Leo 
Pellegrino, who alleged Epic’s “Phone It In” emote constituted unauthorized 
use of his likeness by using his “Signature Move” dance.406 
In March 2020, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Epic’s 
motion to dismiss on all claims but one—Pellegrino’s false endorsement 
claim.407  As for Pellegrino’s right of publicity claims, the court applied the 
transformative use test the Third Circuit adopted in Hart.408  It found Epic had 
sufficiently transformed Pellegrino’s likeness in at least two ways: Fortnite 
avatars “do not share Pellegrino’s identity nor do what Pellegrino does in real 
life.”409  Fortnite avatars using the “Phone It In” emote do not “share 
Pellegrino’s appearance or biographical information.”410  Moreover, Fortnite 
 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id.  Emotes are “customizations for the Fortnite digital avatars” that enable them to “perform 
dances or movements.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Emotes are popular because they “allow players to 
personalize their Fornite experience.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 404. See id.  At least seven lawsuits were filed against Epic.  See Pellegrino, 2020 WL 1531867 
(“Signature Move” dance); Brantley v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-00594-PWG (D. Md. Filed Feb. 
25, 2019) (“Running Man” dance); Baker v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00505 (C.D. Cal. Filed 
Jan. 23, 2019) (“Shoot” dance); McCumbers v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00260 (C.D. Cal. Filed 
Jan. 11, 2019) (“Random” dance); Redd v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10444 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 
17, 2018) (“Floss Dance”); Ribeiro v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10412 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 17, 
2018) (“Carlton” dance); Ferguson v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10110 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 5, 
2018) (“Milly Rock” dance).  Several of these plaintiffs also filed similar lawsuits against Take-Two 
over dance emotes in NBA 2K.  See Ferguson v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-
10425 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 2018); Ribeiro v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-
10417 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 2018); Redd v. Take-Two Interactive, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10441 (C.D. 
Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 2018). 
 405. See generally, e.g., Meaghan H. Kent et al., Gaming Emote Litigation: Battle Royale Ensues 
Over Fortnite Emotes with Plaintiffs Testing Different Causes of Action, VENABLE LLP (Apr. 21, 
2020), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2020/04/gaming-emote-litigation-battle-
royale-ensues-over (discussing the various copyright claims). 
 406. Pellegrino, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 378–79. 
 407. Id. at 391–92. 
 408. Id. at 380–81. 
 409. Id. at 381. 
 410. Id. 
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avatars fight in a battle royale and use emotes “amidst ‘us[ing] weapons and 
violence to eliminate the competition,’” while Pellegrino is a “musical 
performer who executes his Signature Move at musical performances.”411  
While the court did not directly address whether the creative and 
transformative elements predominate over the commercial use of Pellegrino’s 
likeness, or whether the marketability and economic value of Fortnite came 
from its creative elements or from the commercial exploitation of Pellegrino’s 
image, the court did note that “Fortnite players can customize their avatars 
with ‘new characters’ and a variety of emotes mimicking celebrities other than 
Pellegrino.”412 
6. A Non-Video Game Case for Comparison: Sarver v. Chartier 
In 2004, journalist Mark Boal was embedded with a U.S. Army Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal team in Iraq.413  He followed and took photographs and 
videos of Army Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver, and he also interviewed Sarver after 
their return to the United States.414  “Boal later wrote the screenplay for the 
film . . . The Hurt Locker,” which follows the protagonist William James and 
a U.S. Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal team in Iraq.415  Sarver sued for 
violation of his right of publicity, alleging his likeness was used to create 
James.416 
In contrast to Keller and Davis, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the 
transformative use test in Sarver before holding that the First Amendment 
barred Sarver’s claim.417  The court found “California’s right of publicity law 
clearly restricts speech based upon its content,” and therefore is 
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government 
proves that [it is] narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”418  The 
 
 411. Id. (alteration in original). 
 412. Id. (italics added).  In May 2020, the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims 
against Epic in Brantley on copyright preemption grounds without reaching Epic’s First Amendment 
arguments.  Brantley v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-594-PWG, 2020 WL 2794016, at *1 (D. Md. 
May 29, 2020). 
 413. Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id.  For a review of the film, see Peter Bradshaw, The Hurt Locker, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 
2009, 3:25 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/aug/28/the-hurt-locker-review.  
 416. Sarver, 813 F.3d at 896. 
 417. See id. at 905–06. 
 418. Id. at 903 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015)).  
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court then held that the state’s interest in permitting a right of publicity claim 
can survive strict scrutiny only if the defendant’s work “appropriates the 
economic value of a performance or persona or seeks to capitalize off a 
celebrity’s image in commercial advertisements.”419  It found “The Hurt 
Locker is not speech proposing a commercial transaction” and that telling 
Sarver’s story did not steal his “‘entire act’ or otherwise exploit[] the 
economic value of any performance or persona he had worked to develop.”420  
Thus, The Hurt Locker was “fully protected by the First Amendment, which 
safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life—
including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary—and 
transform them into art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays.”421 
V. A BETTER TEST TO BALANCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH THE RIGHT 
OF PUBLICITY 
A. The Need to Apply Strict Scrutiny and a Consistent Test that Respects 
the First Amendment’s Protection of Video Games 
The preceding parts discussed two different legal theories that often result 
in different outcomes despite involving similar facts.  For claims arising from 
the Lanham Act, courts apply the Rogers test and often conclude the First 
Amendment protects the video game from the plaintiff’s claim.422  By 
contrast, for right of publicity claims, courts apply the transformative use test 
and often reach the opposite conclusion.423  This contrast is best highlighted 
in Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc.  In both 
cases, former NFL players sued EA over the use of their likenesses in Madden 
NFL.  But Brown brought his claim under the Lanham Act, while Davis 
brought his claim under the right of publicity.  That made all the difference.424  
 
 419. Id. at 905. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Brown’s Lanham 
Act claim is thus subject to the Rogers test, and we agree with the district court that Brown has failed 
to allege sufficient facts to make out a plausible claim that survives that test.”). 
 423. See, e.g., Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2015) (“EA has not shown 
that its unauthorized use of former players’ likenesses in the Madden NFL video game series qualifies 
for First Amendment protection under the transformative use defense.”). 
 424. Compare Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248 (“Brown’s Lanham Act claim is thus subject to the Rogers 
test, and we agree with the district court that Brown has failed to allege sufficient facts to make out a 
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The Ninth Circuit found the First Amendment protected Madden NFL against 
Brown’s claim but not against Davis’s claim.  And after Brown lost his appeal 
on his Lanham Act claim in the Ninth Circuit, he filed a right of publicity 
claim in state court—and won.425 
The different results in these cases make some theoretical sense.  The 
Lanham Act’s goals are to prevent consumer confusion and to protect mark 
owners and individuals from false advertising or endorsement, while the right 
of publicity seeks to protect a form of intellectual property right in an 
individual.426  Thus, the right of publicity offers broader protections than the 
Lanham Act does.427  But this in fact means courts should give more, not less, 
weight to the First Amendment in the right of publicity context.  Indeed, courts 
have recognized that “publicity rights carry a greater danger of impinging on 
First Amendment rights than do rights” under the Lanham Act.428  By 
prohibiting expression that includes another’s name or likeness, the right of 
publicity is a content-based restriction on speech that should be subject to 
strict scrutiny.429  Any test balancing the right of publicity with the First 
 
plausible claim that survives that test.”), with Davis, 775 F.3d at 1181 (“EA has not shown that its 
unauthorized use of former players’ likenesses in the Madden NFL video game series qualifies for 
First Amendment protection under the transformative use defense.”). 
 425. See After Being Tripped Up By the Lanham Act, Jim Brown Rushes at Electronic Arts with a 
Right of Publicity Claim, CROWELL & MORING (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.crowell.com/ 
NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/After-Being-Tripped-Up-By-the-Lanham-Act-Jim-Brown-
Rushes-at-Electronic-Arts-with-a-Right-of-Publicity-Claim; NFL Legend Jim Brown Takes Judgment 
in Likeness Case Against Electronic Arts, HAGENS BERMAN (June 27, 2016), https://www.hbsslaw. 
com/cases/jim-brown-publicity-rights/pressrelease/jim-brown-publicity-rights-nfl-legend-jim-
brown-takes-judgment-in-likeness-case-against-electronic-arts. 
 426. See THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, §§ 5:6–5:9 (describing 
differences between trademark rights and rights of publicity). 
 427. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because a plaintiff bears a 
reduced burden of persuasion to succeed in a right of publicity action, courts and commentators have 
recognized that publicity rights carry a greater danger of impinging on First Amendment rights than 
do rights associated with false advertising claims.”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Although publicity rights are related to laws 
preventing false endorsement, they offer substantially broader protection[s].”); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 
875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Because the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no 
likelihood of confusion requirement, it is potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.”). 
 428. Parks, 329 F.3d at 460. 
 429. See Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2016); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg 
Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461–62 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).  Many commentators have adopted 
this view.  See, e.g., Mark Conrad, A New First Amendment Goal Line Defense—Stopping the Right 
of Publicity Offense, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 743, 789 (2014); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not A 
Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of 
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 46, 61 (2003); 
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Amendment must reflect this.430 
Despite their differences, the Lanham Act and the right of publicity do 
share some similarities.  Both grant an individual the right to protect an 
economic interest in their name and likeness, and both require courts to 
balance the respective right against the First Amendment.  Thus, while a 
Lanham Act claim is not necessarily “the federal equivalent of the right of 
publicity,”431 their similarities merit consideration of a single test applicable 
to both types of claims.432 
B. Criticism of the Transformative Use Test in the Video Game Context 
and Courts’ Failure to Treat Video Games as Expressive Works 
Several commentators have proposed applying the transformative use test 
to Lanham Act claims as well as right of publicity claims in the video game 
context.433  For example, proposals have been made (1) to use the 
transformative use test for both types of claims,434 (2) to add the 
transformative use test to the Rogers test and then to apply that modified test 
to both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims,435 and (3) to combine the 
transformative use test and a “modified likelihood of confusion test”436 when 
evaluating Lanham Act claims, while leaving the transformative use test alone 
when evaluating right of publicity claims.437 
Proposals to use the transformative use test in Lanham Act claims fail to 
give sufficient weight to the First Amendment.  Indeed, the transformative use 
test should not apply to video games at all, regardless of whether the plaintiff 
 
Volokh, supra note 327, at 912 n.35; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of 
Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 53–54 (1998). 
 430. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.  This is one of the areas in which the Ninth Circuit 
failed in Keller.  Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).  It recognized the Rogers test provides a “broader First 
Amendment defense,” but rejected it in favor of the transformative use test.  Id. at 1279. 
 431. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 432. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 80–81. 
 433. See Papazian, supra note 9; Kimberly Rubin, The Key to Being a Good Referee: The Call the 
Ninth Circuit Missed when Evaluating False Endorsement Claims, 64 EMORY L.J. 1389 (2015); 
Wesley W. Wintermyer, Who Framed Rogers v. Grimaldi?: What Protects Trademark Holders 
Against First Amendment Immunity for Video Games?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1243 (2013). 
 434. Wintermyer, supra note 433, at 1256–61. 
 435. Papazian, supra note 9, at 596–602. 
 436. Rubin, supra note 433, at 1393. 
 437. Rubin, supra note 433, at 1423–27. 
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alleges a Lanham Act claim or a right of publicity claim.438  The California 
Court of Appeal said in de Havilland that the transformative use test “makes 
sense when applied to products and merchandise” but suggested it makes less 
sense when applied to “expressive works such as films, plays, and television 
programs.”439  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sarver confirms the 
transformative use test is unnecessary to balance the First Amendment with 
the right of publicity for expressive works.440 
The result the transformative use test would have on games depicting real-
life scenarios or real people further shows the impropriety of applying that test 
to expressive works such as video games.441  Realism alone is a legitimate 
artistic goal, and the use of a likeness in an expressive work to achieve realism 
has expressive value.442  But under the transformative use test, that selfsame 
goal would defeat a video game publisher’s First Amendment rights.443  The 
more accurate and real a depiction of a likeness, the less transformative it 
necessarily will be.444  One need not look further than No Doubt, Hart, Keller, 
and Davis for examples involving realistic depictions of people.445  But a test 
that punishes realism in video games cannot be squared with the protection 
given to realistic depictions in other expressive works, suggesting the 
transformative use test has no place here.446 
 
 438. See, e.g., Geoffrey F. Palachuk, Transformative Use Test Cannot Keep Pace with Evolving 
Arts, 16 U. DEN. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 259, 277 (2014) (“The transformative use test . . . is not the 
correct test.  That test will result in incoherent and inconsistent application, and chill First Amendment 
protections granted by the United States Constitution.”); Wee Jin Yeo, Disciplining the Right of 
Publicity’s Nebulous First Amendment Defense with Teachings from Trademark Law, 34 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 401, 426, 439–40 (2016) (delineating the inadequacies of the transformative use 
test). 
 439. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019). 
 440. See supra notes 418–421 and accompanying text. 
 441. See Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 2–0 Against 
Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2014) (“The transformative use test is 
unwieldy and verbose.  It tempts courts to judge the artistic value of expressive works in a manner that 
censors speech and belittles our rich First Amendment tradition.”); infra notes 442–446. 
 442. See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013); AM Gen. LLC v. 
Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).  
 443. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525–26. 
 444. See de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630. 
 445. See Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 775 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2015); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. 
(In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1276–79 (9th Cir. 
2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165–69 (3d Cir. 2013); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, 
Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 446. See, e.g., de Havilland, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630.  A company seeking a realistic depiction of a 
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As a practical problem, the transformative use test stifles creativity and 
creates a chilling effect over any video game (indeed, any expressive work) 
that depicts real-life scenarios or real people.447  History shows many 
examples of threats over depictions of entities or individuals in films that 
resulted in changes that might be less accurate.448  One can only imagine if 
individuals depicted in The People v. O.J. Simpson: American Crime Story 
could have prevented its creators from telling that story without portraying 
them or their families more favorably.449  These tactics also occur in the video 
game context.  One commentator cites VIRAG in discussing “trademark 
bullies” who use litigation “as a weapon to silence content creators”—or to 
extract large settlements.450  Another example is the demand by Pinkerton 
Consulting & Investigations for royalties from Rockstar and Take-Two for 
each copy of Red Dead Redemption 2 sold, after news broke about the revenue 
and sales numbers the game had achieved.451  And perhaps the best examples 
 
person already has incentive to work with the person to ensure an accurate depiction, as seen in one 
recent example involving Activision Blizzard approaching Tu Lam to collaborate on incorporating his 
likeness as Daniel “Ronin” Shinoda into Call of Duty: Modern Warfare.  See James Mattone, The Real 
Ronin: An Interview with Tu Lam, ACTIVISION GAMES BLOG (Apr. 28, 2020), https://blog. 
activision.com/call-of-duty/2020-04/The-Real-Ronin-An-Interview-with-Tu-Lam.  Works intending 
to accurately depict real events or people but failing to do so will often receive criticism for that very 
reason.  See Anthony Zangrillo, The Split on the Rogers v. Grimaldi Gridiron: An Analysis of 
Unauthorized Trademark Use in Artistic Mediums, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
385, 388–89 (2017) (delineating the horrible reviews a film received after having to alter the events 
portrayed in the film so as not to depict real events without being “transformative”).  
 447. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1528–29; infra notes 450–452 and accompanying text. 
 448. See Zangrillo, supra note 446, at 388–89. 
 449. See, e.g., Joanna Robinson, Mark Fuhrman Slams The People v. O.J. Simpson for Political 
Correctness, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/03/mark-
fuhrman-people-v-oj-simpson.  In this article, Mark Fuhrman, the LAPD Detective who found the 
famous bloody glove, suggested the TV series does not accurately portray him and complained that 
FX “is attempting to establish a historical artifact with this series without reaching out to any 
prosecution sources.”  Id. 
 450. Zangrillo, supra note 446, at 423–24. 
 451. See Press Release, Red Dead Redemption 2 Achieves Entertainment’s Biggest Opening 
Weekend of All Time, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.businesswire. 
com/news/home/20181030005459/en.  In late October 2018, Rockstar announced that Red Dead 
Redemption 2 had sold more than $725 million in the first three days of its release and set multiple 
records.  Id.  Less than two months later, Pinkerton sent the cease and desist letter to Rockstar and 
Take-Two, which responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of New 
York.  See Declaratory Judgment Action, Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. v. Pinkerton Consulting 
& Investigations, Inc., No. 19-cv-338 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2019).  In April 2019, Rockstar and Take-
Two dismissed the action, stating that Pinkerton had withdrawn its claims for royalties.  See Ryan 
Meyer, The Take-Two Interactive v. Pinkerton Showdown Has Ended in a Draw, JDSUPRA (Apr. 25, 
[Vol. 48: 425, 2021] Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
485 
come from Hart and Keller, in which the NCAA’s rules regarding amateurism 
at the time meant the plaintiffs’ victories in those cases destroyed NCAA 
Football altogether.452 
Moreover, the California Court of Appeal acknowledged in de Havilland 
that courts have “struggled mightily” to “figure out how to apply” the 
transformative use test to expressive works.453  That struggle arises from the 
subjectivity of the test, which requires courts to make qualitative judgments 
over whether a mark or likeness is sufficiently artistic or creative and 
transformed within an expressive work to merit First Amendment 
protection.454  In Comedy III, the California Supreme Court played this 
subjective role by determining that an artist’s sketch of The Three Stooges on 
lithographs and t-shirts did not merit First Amendment protection, while 
stating that Andy Warhol’s portraits of celebrities likely would.455  It even 
recognized that the distinction between works that are protected by the First 
Amendment and those that are not will “sometimes be subtle.”456 
As Justice Holmes said more than a century ago, “[i]t would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.”457  This principle applies in greater force 
today to video games, a newer form of expressive work compared to 
traditional entertainment media.458  The subjective transformative use test 
might be appropriate in copyright law as one of many factors to determine the 
application of a fair use defense, but it is inappropriate for Lanham Act claims 
 
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-take-two-interactive-v-pinkerton-63564. 
 452. See NCAA FOOTBALL (Electronic Arts 2013) (final installment of the NCAA Football series).  
As Hart explains, NCAA rules did not allow college athletes to accept remuneration or permit the use 
of their likenesses to “advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial 
product or service of any kind.”  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 714 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, EA 
could not pay college football players for the right to use their likenesses in any video game.  See id.  
This topic has been the subject of much discussion, many lawsuits, and even legislative action beyond 
the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Justin W. Aimonetti & Christian Talley, Game Changer: Why and 
How Congress Should Preempt State Student-Athlete Compensation Regimes, 72 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 28, 32 (2019–2020) (addressing “the student-athlete compensation dilemma”).  
 453. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).  
 454. See Palachuk, supra note 438, at 263–64. 
 455. Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810–11 (Cal. 2001). 
 456. Id. at 811.  
 457. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 458. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1528. 
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and right of publicity claims when First Amendment rights are at stake.459 
The differences in the results reached by California state courts highlight 
the subjectivity of the transformative use test.460  One can argue that the No 
Doubt likenesses in Band Hero depicted No Doubt’s members as they 
appeared in real life and doing what they did in real life,461 while Ulala in 
Space Channel 5 and CJ in San Andreas did not depict Kirby or Washington 
as they appeared in real life or doing what they did in real life.462  But that 
argument fails when considering Noriega, where the court found the depiction 
of Noriega was transformative even though Activision used real life 
photographs to create Noriega’s likeness and depicted him in the same role he 
served in real life.463  The true difference, it seems, is that the court in No 
Doubt simply refused to consider the other expressive elements of Band Hero 
and instead focused solely on the depiction of No Doubt.464  The most likely 
explanation is that the court believed the game had little value as an expressive 
work. 
A comparison between No Doubt and de Havilland further illustrates the 
problems with the transformative use test.  In de Havilland, the court pointed 
out that the de Havilland character appears only in 4.2 percent of Feud, which 
focuses on the competition between two other characters and includes many 
other stories as well.465  The court also found that FX used de Havilland’s 
 
 459. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 429, at 780–83; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the 
Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187–89 (2006); Volokh, 
supra note 327, at 910, 922 (explaining the problems with analogizing the right of publicity to 
copyright law and importing the transformative use test from copyright’s fair use analysis to the right 
of publicity context).  
 460. See supra notes 258–312 and accompanying text. 
 461. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining how, in Band Hero, players can perform songs using “digital representations of real-life 
rock stars”).  
 462. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 609–610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining 
that Kirby is “the lead singer of a retro-funk dance musical group” and Ulala is an outer space news 
reporter who is “dispatched to investigate an invasion of Earth by dance-loving aliens” and must 
“match the dance moves of [] other characters”); Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 
No. B232929, 2012 WL 5358709, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012) (explaining how much CJ and 
Washington differ, and how many aspects of CJ’s character have no resemblance or connection to 
Washington’s life).  
 463. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, *3–4 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 27, 2014).  
 464. See No Doubt, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–12 (focusing on the depiction of No Doubt in the game 
when deciding whether the game is transformative). 
 465. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).  
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likeness only as “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which [the] original work is 
synthesized,” and that Feud’s marketability and economic value came 
“‘principally from . . . the creativity, skill, and reputation’ of Feud’s creators 
and actors”—not from de Havilland’s fame.466 
The same could be said about the depiction of No Doubt in Band Hero.467  
The band members’ likenesses only constituted a small fraction of Band Hero, 
a game that focuses on allowing “players to simulate performing in a rock 
band in time with popular songs.”468  Even among avatars, Band Hero 
included other “fictional characters created and designed by Activision, . . . 
digital representations of real-life rock stars” besides No Doubt, and the 
ability for players to “design their own unique fictional avatars.”469  And it is 
much more likely that Band Hero’s marketability and economic value derived 
mainly from its gameplay and Activision’s reputation as a video game 
publisher, not from No Doubt’s fame.470  But the court ignored these elements 
of Band Hero.  Instead, it concluded that “the graphics and other background 
content of the game are secondary, and the expressive elements of the game 
remain ‘manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional 
portrait of [No Doubt] so as to commercially exploit [its] fame.’”471  The court 
said that “nothing in the creative elements of the Band Hero elevates the 
depictions of No Doubt to something more than ‘conventional, more or less 
fungible,’ images of its members that No Doubt should have the right to 
control and exploit.”472 
Again, the difference between the two cases appears to be the No Doubt 
court’s sole focus on the depictions of No Doubt’s likenesses while ignoring 
the rest of Band Hero.473  The analyses and results in No Doubt and de 
 
 466. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 
797, 809–810 (Cal. 2001)). 
 467. No Doubt, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–12.  For a similar perspective on No Doubt but without a 
comparison to de Havilland, see So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 192.  
 468. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. (explaining the gameplay of Band Hero and its immense popularity). 
 471. Id. at 411 (alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 
P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001)).  
 472. Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808). 
 473. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 192 (“Context matters, except 
when it doesn’t.  The court treated the transformative test as one that requires some visual change to 
the portrayal of the plaintiffs, focusing on the avatars in the game rather than the game as a whole.”).  
Compare No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–11 (analyzing the characterized likeness of No Doubt in 
performing “the same activity by which the band achieved and maintains its fame” and merely 
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Havilland cannot be reconciled.  If the creators of a television series can 
portray a real person without acquiring her permission, why can’t the creator 
of a video game do so?  And why did FX’s use of de Havilland’s likeness in 
Feud constitute transformative use,474 but Activision’s use of No Doubt’s 
likenesses in Band Hero did not?475  The simplest answer476 can be found in 
the courts’ own statements comparing video games not to other expressive 
works, but to products and merchandise.  In at least four recent cases, courts 
have suggested that video games merit less First Amendment protection than 
other expressive works.477 
First, in de Havilland, the California Court of Appeal distinguished 
“expressive works such as films, plays, and television programs” from 
“products and merchandise such as T-shirts and lithographs, greeting cards, 
and video games, or advertisements for products and merchandise.”478  
Second, in Keller, Judge Thomas’s dissent warned that the majority’s opinion 
would jeopardize “the creative use of historic figures in motion pictures, 
books, and sound recordings,” and “cannot be reconciled with the many cases 
affording such works First Amendment protection.”479  The majority 
responded that the case before it involved a video game and thus “leaves room 
for distinguishing” it from “cases involving other kinds of expressive 
works.”480  Third, during the oral argument in Davis, a Ninth Circuit judge 
 
considering the “other background content of the game [as] secondary”), with de Havilland v. FX 
Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019) 
(considering both de Havilland’s portrayed likeness in the television show and also the “creativity, 
skill and reputation” of the show’s creators). 
 474. de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637–39, 641.  
 475. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–12, 415. 
 476. See United States v. Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d 70, 83 (1st Cir. 2019) (“The rule of Occam’s 
razor teaches that the simplest of competing theories should often be preferred.”). 
 477. At least one commentator appears to buy into this view, treating video games as having the 
same expressive value as sports cards.  See Richard T. Karcher, The Use of Players’ Identities in 
Fantasy Sports Leagues: Developing Workable Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 557, 571 (2007) (arguing that “nobody would suggest that [sports] players should not have 
the right to be compensated for the use of their identities in the video game and trading card markets 
because there is a legitimate social purpose in preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will”).  
One treatise also places video games in the same category as t-shirts, at least in the title.  See Malla 
Pollack, Litigating the Right of Publicity: Your Client’s Face Was on the News, Now It’s on T-Shirts 
and Video Games, 119 AM. JUR. TRIALS 343 (2011). 
 478. de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636, 641 (internal citations omitted). 
 479. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 
724 F.3d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 480. Id. at 1279 n.10 (majority opinion).  
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suggested greeting cards are “at least as expressive as a video game, probably 
more so.”481  Fourth, even in Brown v. Electronic Arts, where the Ninth Circuit 
suggested that “any evolution” in the application of the First Amendment to 
video games merits “greater protection,”482 the court nevertheless went out of 
its way to say “Madden NFL is not the expressive equal of Anna Karenina or 
Citizen Kane.”483 
By contrast, recent statements recognizing video games as equal to other 
expressive works, such as the California Court of Appeal’s description of San 
Andreas as an “animated, interactive movie,” or Judge Thomas’s description 
of NCAA Football as a “work of interactive historical fiction,” are rare and 
often appear only in unpublished or dissenting opinions.484  In this sense, 
courts have regressed over time, given that one court had found in the early 
2000s that video games are entitled to the same First Amendment protection 
as paintings, music, literature, and movies.485 
The seemingly dominant view that video games are lesser than other 
expressive works and are instead comparable with “mundane products”486 or 
merchandise such as lithographs, t-shirts, and greeting cards stands in stark 
contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that the First Amendment 
protects video games just as much as it protects “the protected books, plays, 
and movies that preceded them.”487  The lower courts’ failure to properly 
categorize video games as expressive works can make all the difference, since 
one generally must obtain permission to use marks and likenesses on products 
and merchandise, while permission is unnecessary for expressive works.488 
The perception of video games as products and merchandise might stem 
from a failure to understand that video games today are more complex than 
traditional games, such as Chutes & Ladders, or simple games, such as 
 
 481. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 482. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 483. Id. at 1241.  This comparison might not have been entirely serious; nevertheless, it gives the 
impression that the court believes the expressive value of video games cannot compare to the 
expressive value of books and films. 
 484. Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. B232929, 2012 WL 5358709, at *1 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012) (unpublished opinion); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 485. See Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 486. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(describing “mini-prints, mugs, cups, . . . flags, towels, [and] t-shirts” as “mundane products”). 
 487. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).  
 488. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 178; Restoring Rogers, supra note 
21, at 311–12. 
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Pong.489  Even in the 1970s, adventure games such as Zork with characters, 
plot, and story much like those seen in books already existed.490  But by now, 
in the 21st century, the suggestion that modern video games are products or 
merchandise and not expressive works must be rejected as wrong except 
perhaps in the rarest of circumstances.491  If the First Amendment protects the 
depiction of Olivia de Havilland in Feud and Jeffrey Sarver in The Hurt 
Locker,492 it should likewise protect the depiction of Samuel Keller in NCAA 
Football and Michael Davis in Madden NFL.493 
C. Proposal to Apply the Rogers Test to Both Lanham Act and Right of 
Publicity Claims 
If a test must be applied at all to right of publicity claims,494 courts should 
apply the Rogers test, which strikes the right balance between the First 
Amendment, the Lanham Act, and the right of publicity.  Courts have 
successfully applied the test to Lanham Act claims for more than thirty years 
since the Second Circuit decided Rogers in 1989.  And the test is well-suited 
 
 489. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 4–5, 40 (describing McCarthy’s suggestion that 
“commercially produced games are largely unexpressive and mostly childish” and suggesting Pong’s 
“claim as expressive speech is not very compelling”); see also Jon M. Garon, Playing in the Virtual 
Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through Virtual Worlds and Computer 
Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 472–73 (2008) (“[T]he makers of Pong had no point of view being 
espoused by their square ball or simple paddles . . . .”) (italics added).  
 490. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 57. 
 491. See Garon, supra note 489, at 472–73 (“[M]odern games can be violent, sexy, propagandistic, 
satirical or politically astute.  At some point, the authors of these games tapped them for their 
expressive ability.  The law has slowly followed suit.”) (footnote omitted). 
 492. See de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019) (holding that FX’s use of de Havilland’s character was transformative 
and protected by the First Amendment); see also Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that The Hurt Locker was “fully protected by the First Amendment”). 
 493. See Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2015) (alleging that the defendant 
included plaintiff’s likeness “without authorization” in its video game Madden NFL); Keller v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (affirming that the defendant’s “literal[] recreat[ion]” of the plaintiff in its video game “does 
not qualify for First Amendment protection as a matter of law”).  Perhaps an even better comparison 
can be made to Dryer v. National Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181,1204 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 
814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016), where the District of Minnesota dismissed retired football players’ right 
of publicity claims against the producers of football films because it found the films were expressive 
works and not commercial speech. 
 494. No balancing test is needed at all.  Courts could simply apply the analyses in Guglielmi, de 
Havilland, and Sarver, to determine whether a publisher’s use of an individual’s likeness is a disguised 
commercial advertisement. 
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to the right of publicity context, where it would offer predictability and a less 
subjective test that would adequately protect video games as expressive 
works.495  The artistic relevance and explicitly misleading prongs of the test 
would give publishers the appropriate protection for their games, regardless 
of whether they depict real or fictional people, while preventing them from 
exploiting likenesses of real people as a disguised commercial 
advertisement.496  Assuming states have a legitimate interest in prohibiting 
certain unauthorized use of likenesses in expressive works, the Rogers test 
appropriately considers that interest without overreaching.497 
Nevertheless, a mere proposal to apply the Rogers test is not enough since 
courts across the country have applied different versions of the test.498  While 
these inconsistencies require resolution, there is no need to overcomplicate 
the test.  For example, one commentator suggested applying the Rogers test 
to right of publicity claims, but instead of analyzing whether the use of the 
likeness has artistic relevance, the proposed test would analyze whether the 
use has a “distinct expressive purpose.”499  As the commentator noted, 
however, that inquiry is still related to the transformative use test.500 
Courts should simply apply a clear Rogers test that analyzes whether the 
use of the mark or likeness has artistic relevance to the work, and if so, 
whether the use explicitly misleads as to the source and content of the work.501  
 
 495. See Yeo, supra note 438, at 426; Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259; accord TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 21, § 31:144.50 (“The yes-or-no rule [in the Rogers artistic 
relevance analysis] has the benefit of relieving judges of the need to make an artistic evaluation of 
how important the use of a trademark is in the defendant’s expressive work.”). 
 496. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (articulating the artistic prong and explicitly misleading prongs, 
and how they work together to protect the creator’s expressive work but not exploit the characters used 
for commercial gain); see also Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259 (explaining how the two prongs 
analyze “like and likeness” claims while providing broad protection to the creativity of the artistic 
work).  
 497. See Yeo, supra note 438, at 428, 433 (explaining that the artistic relevance prong gives 
“overriding weight to the public’s interest in free expression” while the second prong will not allow 
the defendant to use First Amendment protection “if the use amounts to an explicit false 
endorsement”). 
 498. See generally Jordan & Kelly, supra note 99, at 834–35  (noting the variety of ways the federal 
appellate courts have applied and refined the Rogers test); Restoring Rogers, supra note 21, at 307 
(explaining the Second and Ninth Circuits’ expansion upon the original Rogers test); Zangrillo, supra 
note 446, at 403–21 (discussing the circuit split that developed over the Rogers test).  
 499. Yeo, supra note 438, at 431–32. 
 500. Yeo, supra note 438, at 431.  
 501. See Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259 (finding that it is advantageous for courts to use the two-
prong test and analyze: “(1) whether the individual’s image and likeness is actually used; and (2) 
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When applying this test in the right of publicity context, courts can view the 
evidence through the lens of whether the use of the name or likeness is 
“‘wholly unrelated’ to the content of the work or is ‘simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’”502  The ultimate 
analysis remains roughly the same.503  This formulation of the Rogers test to 
right of publicity claims has generally been approved by courts,504 
commentators,505 and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.506  And 
formulated in this way, the test would serve the purpose of trademark rights 
to avoid consumer confusion, the purpose of the right of publicity to prohibit 
unauthorized commercial misappropriation of an individual’s name or 
likeness, and the purpose of the First Amendment to protect expressive works. 
The first part of the Rogers test would continue to focus on whether the 
use of the mark or likeness has artistic relevance to the underlying work.  In 
the video game context, this has been and can often be a straightforward 
inquiry.  As one court recognized, this requirement is “real,” but “not unduly 
rigorous” given the potential intrusion upon “First Amendment values.”507  
 
whether the artistic work intentionally or explicitly misleads a consumer as to the source of the work”).  
The Rogers test can get complicated when applied to products and merchandise.  See Restoring 
Rogers, supra note 21, at 311 (noting the complications with the medium of cards as expressive 
content).  In a case involving the unauthorized use of the Honey Badger trademarks on greeting cards, 
the Ninth Circuit identified three additional considerations in analyzing the explicitly misleading 
prong: whether consumers would view the mark alone as identifying the source of the expressive work, 
the degree to which the user and the mark owner use the marks in the same way, and the extent to 
which the user adds its own expressive content to the work beyond the mark itself.  Gordon v. Drape 
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 2018).  Professor Ford discusses greeting cards in Restoring 
Rogers, supra note 21, at 311.  The considerations stated in Gordon rarely apply in the video game 
context and show even more reason to treat video games less like products and merchandise, and more 
like other entertainment media.  See Restoring Rogers, supra note 21 at 311–12.  
 502. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525–26 (footnote omitted) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 503. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1530 (stating that even under the Rogers test, “public figures may 
still challenge unauthorized use in purely commercial expression” and “it disavows commercial 
exploitation through false endorsement”). 
 504. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 
F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; see also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (applying the 
Rogers test); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765–766 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(recognizing that “[t]he Sixth Circuit applies the Rogers test to Lanham Act claims” and applying the 
Rogers test to the case at hand).  
 505. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 77–84; Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259. 
 506. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46, 47 & cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1995) 
(the Restatement’s exact formulation is different but functionally the same). 
 507. AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).  
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Applied to a right of publicity claim, the First Amendment would protect the 
use of a likeness that has artistic relevance to the work but would not protect 
the use of the likeness that has no artistic relevance and is “wholly unrelated” 
to the work, since it then is “simply a disguised commercial advertisement.”508 
The second part of the Rogers test would continue to focus on whether 
the use of a mark or likeness explicitly misleads consumers as to the source 
or content of the work.  Courts should follow the lead of the Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits and scrap the likelihood of confusion and alternative means tests.509  
In the video game context, the explicitly misleading test would thus primarily 
review whether the publisher made an “‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or 
‘explicit misstatement’” that would mislead a consumer as to the source or 
content of the work.510  This appropriately balances the First Amendment with 
trademark law—concerned about consumer confusion—and with the right of 
publicity—concerned about the commercial misappropriation of likenesses.  
If the use of a name or likeness explicitly misleads as to the source or content 
of the work, “it is a disguised commercial advertisement.”511  But if it does 
not explicitly mislead, then the First Amendment should protect the use even 
though the publisher might benefit financially.  This follows longstanding 
precedent that the First Amendment protects expressive works regardless of 
whether those works are for profit.512 
The Eastern District of Michigan’s decision in Romantics serves as a 
prime example of the proper application of the Rogers test to a right of 
publicity claim.513  After finding that Rocks the 80s was an expressive work 
protected by the First Amendment, the court disposed of The Romantics’ right 
of publicity claim.514  Because “the purpose of [Rocks the 80s] is to allow 
players to pretend they are in a rock band,” Activision’s use of the song was 
“not wholly unrelated to the content of the work.”515  And because the song 
and The Romantics were not referenced in advertising materials, and one 
 
 508. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525 (quoting Rogers v.Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 
1989)). 
 509. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447–52 (6th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
724 F.3d 1235, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 510. Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001). 
 511. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525–26. 
 512. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 513. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008); see also 
supra notes 175–186 and accompanying text (discussing Romantics). 
 514. Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766. 
 515. Id.  
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could “play [Rocks the 80s] and never encounter the [s]ong,” it was not a 
“disguised commercial advertisement.”516  The court’s straightforward 
analysis appropriately balanced the First Amendment’s protection of Rocks 
the 80s and The Romantics’ commercial interest in their likenesses. 
Three final examples illustrate the potential application of this test to right 
of publicity cases.  In Parks v. LaFace Records,517 the Sixth Circuit found 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether OutKast’s use of Rosa Parks’s 
name as the title of a song that had “nothing to do with Parks” or her civil 
rights activities lacked artistic relevance and as to whether the song’s title was 
“wholly unrelated” to its content.518  It concluded reasonable people “could 
find the title to be a ‘disguised commercial advertisement’ or adopted ‘solely 
to attract attention’ to the work.”519  In Brown v. Electronic Arts, the Ninth 
Circuit’s hypothetical example of former NFL player Jim Brown’s name or 
likeness in a game called “Jim Brown Presents Pinball with no relation to Jim 
Brown or football beyond the title” might lack artistic relevance.520  
Presumably, such a use would also be wholly unrelated to the work.  And in 
Guglielmi, the California Supreme Court gave the hypothetical example of the 
defendants publishing “Rudolph Valentino’s Cookbook” where “neither the 
recipes nor the menus described in the book were in any fashion related to 
Rudolph Valentino.”521 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article’s review of cases involving the Lanham Act and the right of 
publicity in the video game context has revealed at least two necessary 
changes.  First, it is beyond time for courts to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
teaching in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n and recognize video 
games as expressive works equal to traditional entertainment media instead of 
comparing them to mundane products and merchandise.  Second, the 
transformative use test has failed to adequately apply First Amendment 
protection to video games, and courts should instead apply the Rogers test to 
both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims.  By making these two changes, 
 
 516. Id. 
 517. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 518. Id. at 452–53, 458, 461. 
 519. Id. at 461 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 520. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013) (italics added). 
 521. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979).  
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video games might finally receive the First Amendment protection they 
deserve. 
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*** 
